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INTRODUCTION
The degree ofcivilization in a society is revealed by entering its prisons.
- Fyodor Dostoyevsky'
Does [your law] say that, before presenting a petition, you shall look into it,
and see whether it comes from the virtuous, and the great and the mighty? No,
sir, it says no such thing; the right ofpetition belongs to all.
-John Quincy Adams, on petitions from slaves, 18372
The prison guards at Iowa were not fans of Jeffery Royal.' Between his
arrest and eventual imprisonment, Royal sustained a spinal cord injury in a
farm accident. When he arrived in prison, he found himself unable to turn his
wheelchair in his cell, unable to obtain medical assistance, and unable to extract
himself from his prison jumpsuit without throwing himself to the floor. His
repeated requests for pants were denied, and prison officials confiscated his
wheelchair, forcing Royal to crawl on the floor. Rather than return the chair,
the Security Director issued a directive "stating that any inmate seen crawling
on the floor would be subject to discipline."4 Royal submitted seventeen
grievances and ultimately filed a motion in court seeking return of the
wheelchair.s When the Director "tired of Royal's behavior," he put Royal in
solitary confinement for sixty days.'
1. FYODOR DosTOYEVSKY, THE HOUSE OF THE DEAD: A NOVEL IN Two PARTS 76 (Constance
Garnett trans., 1957).
2. WILLIAM LEE MILLER, ARGUING ABOUT SLAVERY: THE GREAT BATTLE IN THE UNITED STATES
CONGRESS 262 (2d prtg. 1996) (alteration in original).
3. Royal v. Kautzky, 375 F.3d 720, 722 (8th Cir. 2004). Royal's case has become shorthand for a
dispute among the federal circuits over "whether the physical injury requirement applies to
constitutional claims in which physical injuries rarely occur, such as violations of the First
and Fourteenth Amendments." Id. at 727 (Heaney, J., dissenting); see, e.g., Jeff B. Allison,
Comment, First Amendment Claims Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act: A Mental or
Emotional Injury?, 7 4 U. CIN. L. REV. 1067, 1o67 (2oo6) (opening with Royal); Allison Cohn,
Comment, Can $1 Buy Constitutionality?: The Effect of Nominal and Punitive Damages on the
Prison Litigation Reform Act's Physical Injury Requirement, 8 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 299, 315 n.92,
324-25 (20o6) (using Royal to illustrate courts' denials of retaliation claims and punitive
damages).
4. Royal, 375 F.3d at 727 (Heaney, J., dissenting).
5. Royal filed a motion for a preliminary injunction. Id. at 726.




Royal filed a civil action for retaliation, alleging a violation of his
constitutional right to access the courts, secured for prisoners by the Petition
Clause of the First Amendment.! The district court found that the prison
director had "unconstitutionally retaliated against Royal by placing him in
segregation because [he] filed numerous grievances,"8 but held that Royal was
ineligible for compensatory or punitive damages, citing language from the
Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), which specifies that prisoners may not
recover for "mental or emotional injury" without a "prior showing of physical
injury,"' and holding that the bar applied to First Amendment claims.'"
This Note is about the practice, employed by about half of the federal
circuits, of conditioning recovery for retaliation claims brought by prisoners on
a prior showing of physical injury. It argues that the portion of the PLRA that
gives rise to this practice is unconstitutional as applied to claims, like
retaliation, arising under the Petition Clause, because it arbitrarily impairs
prisoners' right to access the courts and, in doing so, enables retaliation against
prisoner litigants to go unchecked.
American prisons are beset by a culture of retaliation." In the prison
7. U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law ... abridging .. . the right of the people
... to petition the Government for a redress of grievances."). Royal's complaint
included allegations that: 1) he could not turn his wheelchair in his cell; 2) he was
unable to get to the toilet or shower; 3) he had blood in his catheter but no action
was taken by medical staff because he did not have an elevated temperature; 4) he
was transferred in a van that was not handicapped accessible, requiring him to fall
to the floor before pulling himself onto the van's seat; 5) he had to fall on the
ground and pull himself up onto a shower chair in order to shower; 6) he had to
lay on the floor after using the toilet to pull on his prison-issue jumpsuit, and his
request to wear pants instead of a jumpsuit was denied; and 7) his requests for an
enema were delayed -once for ten days and once for six days.
Royal, 375 F.3d at 726 (Heaney, J., dissenting).
8. Id. at 722 (majority opinion).
9. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c) (2000)).
10. Royal returned to his cell with $i in nominal damages and $i.5o in attorney's fees. Some
courts have read the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) to bar nominal damages as well.
The issue of nominal damages is discussed at length in this Note. See infra notes 120-127 and
accompanying text.
11. Patterns of retaliation against employees filing discrimination suits, the need for
whistleblower laws, colloquial expressions like "snitches get stitches" or "don't be a nark,"
and the Talmudic law of mesira, which prohibits Jews from informing on each other to
non-Jewish authorities, all illustrate the sociology of distaste for those who betray group
secrets. For a treatment of retaliation in the prison context, see James E. Robertson, "One of
the Dirty Secrets of American Corrections": Retaliation, Surplus Power, and Whistleblowing
Inmates, 42 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 611 (20o9). For a treatment of retaliation outside of the
prison context, see Joyce Rothschild & Terance D. Miethe, Whistle-Blower Disclosures and
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context, this translates to a pattern in which officials punish prisoners who file
grievances protesting the conditions of their confinement or exposing the
behaviors of their jailors." Retaliation against prisoners can take many forms:
officials might send prisoners to solitary confinement, deny essential services,
construct false weapons charges, or subject prisoners to beatings, verbal abuse,
or rape, all as punishment for attempting to communicate with the world
outside the prison." Indeed, retaliation in prisons is a pattern so "deeply
engrained in the correctional officer subculture" that "[c]orrectional officers
who retaliate against prisoners cannot be regarded as rogue actors."' 4 By some
estimates, a majority of prisoners have experienced retaliation by guards for
filing, or attempting to file, an administrative grievance or a complaint in
court, and a majority of prison staff report that their colleagues have retaliated
Management Retaliation: The Battle To Control Information About Organization Corruption, 26
WORK & OCCUPATIONS 107 (1999).
12. JOHN BOSTON, LEGAL AID SOCIETY, THE PRISON LITIGATION REFORM ACT (20o6),
http://www.law.yale.edu/documents/pdf/BostonPLRATreatise.pdf (noting "a recurrent
pattern in American prisons of threats and retaliation against prisoners who file grievances
and complaints"). For a general survey of the prevalence of prison violence, including
staff-on-inmate violence, see Nancy Wolff et al., Physical Violence Inside Prisons: Rates of
Victimization, 34CRIM.JUST.& BEHAV. 588, 588-90 (2007). See also Prison Abuse Remedies Act
of 2oo7: Hearing on H.R. 41o9 Before the Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism & Homeland Security
of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, ioth Cong. 72 (2008) [hereinafter Hearing on H.R. 4109]
(statement of Ernest D. Preate, Jr.) ("If you think that retaliation is not a part of everyday
prison life, then you don't know the reality of prisons."); Robertson, supra note ni, at
613-14; No Equal Justice: The Prison Litigation Reform Act in the United States, HUM. RTs.
WATCH 20, 28, 42 (2009), http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/uso6o9web.pdf
(documenting inmate fears of retaliation, including through congressional testimony in
support of the Prison Rape Elimination Act).
13. Retaliation in prisons is widespread. E.g., Royal, 375 F.3d at 726-27 (described above);
Dannenberg v. Valadez, 338 F.3 d 1070, 1072 (9 th Cir. 2003) (concerning retaliation against a
prisoner for assisting another prisoner with litigation); Trobaugh v. Hall, 176 F.3d 1087,
1088-89 (8th Cir. 1999) (concerning a prisoner placed in isolation for filing grievances);
Suggs v. Caballero, No. o6-CV-13931, 2009 WL 368208, at *2 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 11, 2009)
(involving retaliation against an inmate who tried to file a class action against a prison
employee in which the employee terrorized and intimidated the inmate in an area obscured
from the view of the security cameras, informing him that he could "find a razor blade in
your room whenever I want, and have your ass placed in segregation"); Cheryl Bell et al.,
Rape and Sexual Misconduct in the Prison System: Analyzing America's Most "Open" Secret, 18
YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 195, 204, 210, 217 (1999) (documenting patterns and mechanisms of
retaliatory punishment, and citing a report documenting "widespread sexual abuse of female
prison inmates" and a pattern of retaliation by prison officials to punish or deter inmates
from reporting abuse); John Boston, The Prison Litigation Reform Act: The New Face of Court
Stripping, 67 BROOK. L. REv. 429 (2001) (surveying the PLRA).
14. Robertson, supra note 11, at 612 (noting that correctional officers hassle inmates, subject




against prisoners for such actions."s
The PLRA, passed in a triptych of jurisdiction-stripping statutes in the
mid-199os, imposes a procedural formality that facilitates institutional
retaliation against prisoners who attempt to exercise the "fundamental political
right"" of access to the courts by making it difficult for prisoners to recover
against guards who abuse them. The Act specifies, in relevant part, that "[n]o
Federal civil action may be brought by a prisoner confined in a jail, prison, or
other correctional facility, for mental or emotional injury suffered while in
custody without a prior showing of physical injury."' 7
Roughly half of the federal circuits read the prior physical injury
requirement to bar claims for First Amendment injuries, like retaliation for an
attempt to access the courts, an injury, for prisoners, to the First Amendment
right to "petition the government for redress of grievances. "' The other half
object to placing First Amendment claims within the physical/mental
taxonomy, holding that the prior physical injury requirement does not apply to
claims for violations of "intangible" rights.' 9 They argue, as did the dissent in
Royal, that applying the requirement to First Amendment violations would
block legitimate claims2 o and that doing so misunderstands the nature of
violations of "intangible" constitutional rights," which "occur at the time of the
deprivation, not at a later time when the physical or emotional harm
15. Id. at 613-14 (citing a "groundbreaking survey of Ohio inmates" finding that "70.1% of
inmates who brought grievances indicated that they had suffered retaliation thereafter"
and that "87% of all respondents and nearly 92% of the inmates using the
grievance process agreed with the statement, 'I believe staff will retaliate or get
back at me if I use the grievance process"'); see also JOHN J. GIBONS & NICHOLAS
DE B. KATZENBACH, VERA INST. OF JUST., CONFRONTING CONFINEMENT: A REPORT
OF THE COMMISSION ON SAFETY AND ABUSE IN AMERICA'S PRISONS 92-94
(2oo6), http://www.vera.org/download.;ile=2845/ConfrontingConfinement.pdf [hereinafter
CONFRONTING CONFINEMENT] (documenting the ineffectiveness of prison grievance systems
and noting that "[p]reliminary findings from a survey of prisoners by the Correctional
Association of New York suggest that more than half of prisoners who file grievances report
experiencing retaliation for making a complaint against staff," and that "[c]orrections
officers also fear retaliation by fellow officers if they report wrongdoing").
16. Thaddeus-X v. Blatter, 175 F. 3 d 378, 391 (6th Cir. 1999) (quoting Hudson v. McMillian, 503
U.S. 1, 15 (1992) (Blackmun, J., concurring in the judgment)).
17. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e) (20o6).
is. U.S. CONsT. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law ... abridging ... the right of the people
... to petition the Government for a redress of grievances."); see infra note 96 (collecting
cases).
ig. See infra note 99 (collecting cases).
zo. Royal v. Katuzky, 375 F.3 d 720, 729 (8th Cir. 2004) (Heaney, J., dissenting).
21. Id. at 730.
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manifests."2
In doctrinal terms, the split amongst the federal circuits turns on whether
to award compensatory damages for constitutional torts recognized, in the days
before the PLRA, as capable of monetization." In theoretical terms, the split
reflects disputes about hierarchies of injury and the nature of First Amendment
harms, both in general and in the context of the PLRA. And in broader terms,
the split reflects confusion about the interlocking harms that stem from denial
of access to the courts. This confusion, as will be argued later, has translated
into harms that transcend injuries to individual litigants.
The pages to follow argue that interpreting the prior physical injury
requirement to bar recovery for retaliation against prisoner litigants violates the
Petition Clause. Before proceeding further, two notes on scope. First, this Note
is not about whether prisoners have a constitutional right to access the courts to
protest the conditions of their confinement. That has been established.2 The
argument here is that by denying recovery for retaliatory violations of that
right, courts are validating the extrajudicial adjudication of claims in a way that
hampers prisoners' constitutional rights, eliminates the flow of critical
22. Id. at 726-31. Judge Heaney argued that First Amendment rights were "not concerned with
preventing physical abuse by government agents, but rather with the invasion of the sphere
of intellect and spirit which it is the purpose of the First Amendment . . . to reserve from all
official control." Id. at 730 (quoting Shaheed-Muhammad v. Dipaolo, 138 F. Supp. 2d 99,
1o8 (D. Mass. 2001)).
23. See discussion infra notes 120-127 and accompanying text.
24. There is a wide body of case law establishing both a prisoner's right to access the courts and
the impermissibility of retaliation in reaction to a prisoner's exercise of constitutionally
protected rights. See Jacobs v. Beard, 172 F. App'x 452, 454 (3d Cir. 20o6) (noting that the
plaintiff "was asserting a broader right; that of access to the courts, which is constitutionally
protected" (citing Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 355 (1996))). In Lewis, the Court held
that prisoners retain, at minimum, the right to "a reasonably adequate opportunity to present
claimed violations of fundamental constitutional rights to the courts." 518 U.S. at 351 (quoting
Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 825 (1977)); see also infra note 55 (listing access-to-courts cases).
But see infra note 236 (describing limitations on a prisoner's right to litigate).
Retaliation has long been specifically proscribed. See, e.g., Holmes v. Williamson, No.
11-CV-3230, 2011 WL 3241419, at *2 (C.D. Ill. July 27, 2011) (noting that "[t]he federal
courts have long recognized a prisoner's right to seek administrative or judicial remedy of
conditions of confinement, . . . as well as the right to be free from retaliation for exercising
this right" and collecting cases (alteration in original) (citations omitted) (quoting Babcock
v. White, 102 F-3d 267, 276 (7th Cir. 1996))); Jones v. Coughlin, 696 F. Supp. 916, 920
(S.D.N.Y. 1988) ("[A]ction taken by prison officials which would otherwise be
constitutional becomes unconstitutional if such action was taken as reprisal for the
prisoner's exercise of constitutionally protected rights."); Morrison v. LeFevre, 592 F. Supp.
1052, 1071 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) ("[P]risoners in this nation should not fear the imposition of




information to the public, and abdicates the judiciary's responsibility to check
governmental excess." Second, under the prior physical injury requirement,
prisoners may encounter petition violations at three distinct chronological
points: when a prisoner files an underlying claim and is denied recovery
because the claim is for a nonphysical injury; when the prisoner is retaliated
against for filing that claim; and when the court denies recovery for the
retaliation. Only the latter two cases are addressed here. The devaluing of what
this Note will call classically emotional claims, like psychological trauma or
distress - as distinguished from what it will call intangible or abstract claims,
like speech, religion, or due process - is problematic, and, as has been argued
elsewhere," may itself produce petition violations. But injuries of this first type
are beyond the scope of this discussion. Without a retaliatory component, the
first violation may block a damages award, but it does not itself bar access to
the courts. By contrast, the second violation punishes the suit itself, and the
third validates and legitimizes that punishment, implicating the judiciary in the
arbitrary denial of a constitutional right. Because the discussion to follow is
concerned with the informational character of prisoner suits, it focuses on the
latter two forms of injury.
This Note intersects with two strands in the academic literature, the first
dealing with the prior physical injury requirement and the second dealing with
the right to petition. Scholarly attention to the prior physical injury
requirement has been limited, despite the provision's reach. The few academic
treatments to consider the requirement have been confined to doctrinal
exegesis, outlining the mechanisms by which the PLRA stifles prisoner access
.25. Thus the question here is not whether prisoners have a right to access the courts, but once
they have such a right, whether and to what extent the courts may protect it against
encroachment, whether by the Executive, in the form of retaliation or retaliation-facilitating
policies, or by Congress, in the form of legislation forcing or enabling the constriction of
prisoners' access to the courts.
26. None of these terms is perfect, as emotions are abstract and intangible. The terms enmeshed
within the PLRA are likewise imperfect, as mental or emotional reactions might have
physical roots. Using "emotional" and "constitutional" as shorthand would not suffice, since
some constitutional claims encompass emotional harm (those brought under the Eighth
Amendment, for instance). Imprecise as they are, "emotional" and either "intangible" or
"abstract" will have to do.
27. See, e.g., James E. Robertson, Psychological Injury and the Prison Litigation Reform Act: A "Not
Exactly," Equal Protection Analysis, 37 HARv. J. ON LEGIS. 105, 117-19, 146-49 (2000)
(discussing classically "mental or emotional" injuries).
28. Petition violations are thus distinct from (some) other procedural barriers. See infra Sections
I.B, II.C (distinguishing the prior physical injury requirement from procedural bars like
filing fees, statutes of limitations, and heightened pleading requirements).
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to the courts; 9 arguing that judicial interpretation of the provision likely
misinterprets congressional intent; 3 o describing the circuit split over the
applicability of § 1997e(e) to First Amendment and other intangible
constitutional claims;" and arguing that barring recovery for litigants based on
their status as prisoners violates the Equal Protection Clause.32 Few have
attempted to explain why subjecting petition claims to the physical/mental
dyad is problematic, beyond making the circular claim that restrictions on
access to the courts infringe upon the right to access the courts. And all have
focused on the individual-rights aspects of barring recovery for First
Amendment violations, missing entirely the broader structural implications of
predicating access to the courts on the ability to satisfy a physical predicate
unrelated to the right itself.
Nor has the literature on petitioning produced a defense of petition
sufficient to shield it from the prior physical injury requirement or even from
the doctrinal shifts presaged by the Court's recent petition holding, described
below." The First Amendment literature, as a general matter, has neglected
petitioning, and major casebooks skip the Petition Clause entirely. 4 A small
number of academic treatments have provided detailed histories of the
distinctive origins of petition and speech, of petitioning in colonial America
2g. Erica M. Eisinger, Daniel E. Manville & Kelly Rimmer, Prisoners' Rights, 52 WAYNE L. REV.
857, 915-16 (20o6); Robertson, supra note ii, at 635.
30. Jennifer Winslow, The Prison Litigation Reform Act's Physical Injury Requirement Bars
Meritorious Lawsuits: Was It Meant To?, 49 UCLA L. REv. 1655, 1677-78 (2002).
31. Corbett H. Williams, Evisceration ofthe First Amendment: The Prison Litigation Reform Act and
Interpretation of42 U.S.C. 5 1997e(e) in Prisoner First Amendment Claims, 39 Loy. L.A. L. REv.
859, 864-81 (20o6); Allison, supra note 3, at 1072-80, 1086-87. Both articles outline the split
between the restrictive, see infra note 96, and permissive, see infra note 99, circuits and side
with the latter, but neither analysis goes further. But see Molly R. Schimmels, Comment,
First Amendment Suits and the Prison Litigation Reform Act's "Physical Injury Requirement": The
Availability of Damage Awards for Inmate Claimants, 51 U. KAN. L. REV. 935, 968-70 (2002)
(taking the opposite view).
32. Cohn, supra note 3, at 315-22 (arguing that § 1997e(e) violates the Equal Protection Clause,
despite the potential for nominal or punitive damages, because it effectively deprives
inmates of privileges because of their status as prisoners, "creating an irreparable hole in
civil rights law"). Robertson, supra note 27, at lo6-07, makes a similar argument in speaking
not of First Amendment harms, but of "mental or emotional" injuries, as does Jason E.
Pepe, Challenging Congress's Latest Attempt To Confine Prisoners' Constitutional Rights: Equal
Protection and the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 23 HAMLINE L. REv. 58, 63-80 (1999).
33. Borough of Duryea v. Guarnieri, 131 S. Ct. 2488, 2500 (2011).
34. See, e.g., GEOFFREY R. STONE, Louis M. SEIDMAN & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE FIRST





and the early Republic, and of the collapse of petition into speech during
debates over slavery, illustrating that petitioning once enjoyed protections
superior to those afforded speech, press, or assembly." Through these works
emerge scattered snapshots of the various roles of petitioning in furthering
individual rights," "keeping the government informed,"37 and "reaffirming the
judicial role." At a normative level, contemporary treatments of petitioning
have argued that, in light of historical evidence, the courts are correct to hold
that the right to petition "must include a substantive right of access to courts"
and that the failure to differentiate between speech and petition has "placed an
inappropriate limitation on the right to petition."40 But none has linked these
various roles into a unified portrait of petitioning and its role in the
constitutional order. Petitioning remains, despite several discrete
historiographical advances, almost entirely untheorized.
This is the first academic treatment to offer a theoretical view of petition
harms and the first to join the scattered narratives of the various roles of
petitioning to form a theory of petitioning as a threefold structural protection.
It is the first in the literature specific to the physical injury requirement to
transcend doctrinal exegesis or to illustrate why taxonomizing petition
violations within the physical/mental injury dyad is inappropriate as a matter
3s. See generally Norman B. Smith, "Shall Make No Law Abridging . . . ": An Analysis of the
Neglected, but Nearly Absolute, Right of Petition, 54 U. CIN. L. REv. 1153 (1986) (tracing the
origins of petitioning, with a focus on English history); Julie M. Spanbauer, The First
Amendment Right To Petition Government for a Redress of Grievances: Cut from a Different
Cloth, 21 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 15, 16-17 (1993) (disputing the Supreme Court's contention
that the Speech and Petition Clauses were "cut from the same cloth" and tracing the distinct
history of the right to petition); Stephen A. Higginson, Note, A Short History of the Right To
Petition Government for the Redress of Grievances, 96 YALE L.J. 142 (1986) (tracing the history
of petitioning with a focus on the role of petitioning in early American life).
36. See, e.g., Higginson, supra note 35, at 153 (describing the role of petitioning in securing
individual rights).
37. See, e.g., Smith, supra note 35, at 1154.
38. See, e.g., James E. Pfander, Restoring the Right To Petition, 94 Nw. U. L. REV. 219, 219 (1999)
(arguing that "the framers understood the right to petition the courts for redress as
reaffirming the judicial role in determining claims against the government and as rejecting
sovereign immunity"); James E. Pfander, Sovereign Immunity and the Right To Petition:
Toward a First Amendment Right To Pursue judicial Claims Against the Government, 91 Nw. U.
L. REV. 899 (1997).
39. Spanbauer, supra note 35, at 43; see also id. at 49 (arguing that "invocation of the judicial
process is a protected form of petitioning," and that the petition right "should afford
substantive protection to all who claim that state actors have retaliated against them for
pursuing litigation") (capitalization altered from original).
40. Smith, supra note 35, at 1154.
1033
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
of theory, independent of historical claims about the role of petitioning or
normative claims about prisoners' rights to access the courts. In addition to
making a claim about the unconstitutionality of the prior physical injury
requirement, this Note intervenes in two debates about First Amendment
theory, both made urgent by the Court's holding in Borough of Duryea v.
Guarnieri,' discussed below.
This Note argues that the prior physical injury requirement is
unconstitutional as applied to violations of prisoners' First Amendment rights
to access the courts. Rather than understanding petition violations as injuries
to individual rights alone, it argues that petition violations, including
retaliation, create three layers of harm: to individuals, to the public, and to the
courts as institutions. But the prior physical injury requirement, at least under
the restrictive interpretation, ignores the latter two types of harm by forcing
petition violations into the mold of private torts, miscasting court-access
barriers as individual rather than structural wrongs.
To contextualize this argument and the ferocity of the barriers imposed by
the PLRA, Part I provides background on prisoner access to courts and on the
genesis, intent, and consequences of the Act. Parts II, III, and IV argue that
petitioning implicates a troika of constitutional interests transcending those of
individual litigants. Part II argues that interpreting the PLRA to bar
substantive recovery creates harms to individual plaintiffs, threatening both the
right to access the courts and the realization of underlying individual rights.
Part III argues that the prior physical injury requirement harms the public by
impairing what this Note will call the "information function" of lawsuits: the
critical role played by lawsuits in pushing information about prison life to the
outside world, a role enshrined in both the original right to "petition the
Government for a redress of grievances"" and in contemporary norms about
open courts and public participation in the judicial process. Part IV argues that
the requirement undermines the courts as institutions both by destabilizing the
structural division between the branches of government and by interfering
with "the duty and authority of the Judiciary to call the jailer to account."'I
Constitutional norms of due process, open access, expression, and the
separation of powers intersect in the First Amendment right to petition the
government, a structural recognition not only of the individual right to seek
remedy, but of the importance of facilitating the flow of information to the
public, particularly in the context of closed institutions, and of enabling courts
41. 131 S. Ct. 2488, 2491-92 (2011); see infra Part V.
42. U.S. CONsT. amend. I.




to exercise effective oversight. Petitioning, in other words, must be understood
not as an individual "emotional" right, but as the underpinning of an
informational system in which, particularly in the absence of press and the
franchise, prisoners' own communications with courts are the critical element.
Understanding the Petition Clause as a point of overlap suggests that the First
Amendment has an answer to the question of what harm comes from limiting
access to the courts: a structural answer, privileging the importance of
information to democratic governance.
Part V argues that understanding the right to petition in this way suggests
that contemporary petition holdings are misguided, and uses the theory of
petitioning that emerges through the prison setting to intervene in a broader
doctrinal debate over the nature of the right. A combination of historical
accident, doctrinal confusion, and judicial inertia has led the Court to conflate
speech and petition, culminating in last Term's holding in Borough ofDuryea v.
Guarnieri that although speech and petition are distinct protections, certain
doctrinal tests could be transposed from speech to petition.4 This holding
reflects the understanding that speech and petition are not only textually but
theoretically proximate. But the lawsuits-as-information model suggests that
although petition and speech share concerns for expressive freedom and public
deliberation, petitioning implicates a set of constitutional concerns distinct
from those encompassed in protections for speech. Petitioning protects, among
others, the individual's right to invoke the state's adjudicatory capabilities and
the state's interest in delivering them. As such, the petition guarantee protects
the act of reaching to the government for redress, rather than the content of the
grievance itself.
Understanding petitioning in this way illustrates the theoretical
incoherence of looking to speech frameworks to resolve petition claims, and
suggests that Guarnieri was wrongly decided, or in the alternative, that further
transposition of the Guarnieri principle would threaten the core protections of
the right to petition. Outlining the theoretical underpinnings of the petition
right is a project of some urgency. After Guarnieri, the Court is on the verge of
further doctrinal mistake, and the circuit split over the prior physical injury
requirement may push the Court to elaborate on prisoners' right to petition.
Part V thus closes by offering a framework for petitioning distinct from speech.
44. Guarnieri, 131 S. Ct. at 25oo.
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1. BACKGROUND
The PLRA, enacted in 1996, reflected attempts by a conservative Congress
to reverse the perceived interventionist strides of the post-Civil Rights era
courts. 4s Prisoners had too much time on their hands, legislators argued, and
courts had gotten into the habit of sympathizing with litigants, using the
banner of civil rights to entertain even "frivolous" complaints. But in passing
the Act, legislators made a critical error, mistaking the symptoms of a dramatic
increase in the prison population for "frivolity." As a result, legislators enacted
overbroad legislation that has impeded meritorious claims, including valid
prisoner filings exposing civil rights abuses."6 This Part places the PLRA in
historical context, first explaining, in Section I.A, the rapid growth in prisoner
filings in the federal courts in the latter half of the twentieth century, and in
Section I.B, charting the conservative backlash to increasing intervention by
the federal courts.
A. Bringing the Prison to Court
The federal courts, under the then-dominant "hands-off' doctrine, 4  heard
45. The jurisdiction-stripping efforts of the mid-199os-the PLRA and its cousins the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act and the Illegal Immigration Reform, and
Immigrant Responsibility Act-"may be the most significant limitations on federal
jurisdiction since those enacted in connection with World War II price controls and draft
legislation." Vicki C. Jackson, Introduction: Congressional Control ofJurisdiction and the Future
of the Federal Courts-Opposition, Agreement, and Hierarchy, 86 GEO. L.J. 2445, 2446 (1998).
The PLRA was ultimately passed with bipartisan support.
46. See Margo Schlanger & Giovanna Shay, Preserving the Rule of Law in America's jails and
Prisons: The Case for Amending the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 11 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 139, 141
(2008) ("[The prior physical injury requirement] has obstructed judicial remediation of
religious discrimination, coerced sex, and other constitutional violations typically
unaccompanied by physical injury, undermining the regulatory regime that is supposed to
prevent such abuses.").
47. The "hands-off' doctrine was a doctrine of nonintervention in state prison affairs by the
federal courts. Courts generally marshaled arguments about separation of powers and
voiced concerns about interfering with the judgment of prison officials. See Exparte Pickens,
101 F. Supp. 285, 290 (D. Alaska 1951) (finding that prisons were overcrowded and prisoners
were subjected to conditions that were "inexcusable and shocking to the sensibilities of all
civilized persons," but refusing to intervene); Ruffin v. Commonwealth, 62 Va. (21 Gratt.)
790, 796 (1871) (holding that prisoners were "slaves of the State," having "not only forfeited
[their] liberty, but all [their] personal rights except those in which the law in its humanity
accords [them]"); Alison Brill, Rights Without Remedy: The Myth of State Court Accessibility
After the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 30 CARDozo L. REV. 645, 652 n.38 (20o8) ("In effect,




virtually no prisoner rights cases until the 1960s,,8 when federalism concerns"9
ceded to widespread concerns about prisoner treatment, particularly in the
South.so Federal courts began long-term oversight of state prisons,"
abandoning the hands-off policy in Cooper v. Pate.5 2 National advocacy groups
undertook systematic litigation of prison conditions cases," particularly after
the Court applied the protections of the Civil Rights Act to state prisoners.
Over the course of several decades, the Supreme Court expanded the range of
constitutional protections available to prisoners, from the right to be free from
excessive force and the right to adequate medical care to the rights to adequate
prison conditions, religious freedom, and due process.ss Courts at all levels
(alteration in original) (quoting Gore v. United States, 357 U.S. 386, 393 (1958)
(Frankfurter, J.)) (internal quotation marks omitted)). See generally Robert T. Sigler &
Chadwick L. Shook, The Federal Judiciary and Corrections: Breaking the "Hands-Off' Doctrine,
7 CruM. JUST. POL'Y REV. 245, 245-46 (1995) (describing the death of the "hands-off
doctrine").
48. See Brian J. Ostrom, Roger A. Hanson & Fred L. Cheesman, II, Congress, Courts, and
Corrections: An Empirical Perspective on the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 78 NoRE DAME L.
REv. 1525, 153o n.18 (2003); Joshua J. Fougere, Note, Paying for Prisoner Suits: How the
Source of Damages Impacts State Correctional Agencies' Behavior, 43 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS.
283, 288-90 (2010).
49. See Fougere, supra note 48, at 289 n-36 ("Other justifications [for the hands-off doctrine]
included separation of powers, lack of judicial expertise, and fear of chilling prison
officers."); see also Giovanna Shay & Johanna Kalb, More Stories of Jurisdiction-Stripping and
Executive Power: Interpreting the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), 29 CARDOZO L. REV.
291, 306 (2007) (reviewing justifications).
50. Margo Schlanger, Beyond the Hero Judge: Institutional Reform Litigation as Litigation, 97
MIcH. L. REV. 1994, 2oo6-o8 (1999); see also Brill, supra note 47, at 652-53 (reviewing
history).
Si. See, e.g., Holt v. Sarver, 309 F. Supp- 362 (E.D. Ark. 1970).
52. 378 U.S. 546 (1964). These developments coincided with the expansion of litigants' ability
to use 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the federal courts. See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
53. See Shay & Kalb, supra note 49, at 298 (discussing the efforts of the ACLU and others).
54. Cooper, 378 U.S. at 546.
5s. See Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 4 (1992) (right to be free from excessive force); Estelle
v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103 (1976) (right to adequate medical care); Wolff v. McDonnell,
418 U.S. 539, 556 (1974) (right to minimal due process protections in proceedings to strip
prisoners' good-time credits); Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 322 (1972) (right to religious
freedom); see also Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 817-18, 824 (1977) (requiring that
prisoners be granted access to law libraries and other means of accessing legal knowledge
and holding that states have "affirmative obligations to assure all prisoners meaningful
access to the courts," as well as noting the per curiam holding in Younger that such services
are constitutionally mandated); Younger v. Gilmore, 404 U.S. 15, 15 (1971) (per curiam)
(prohibiting prisons from limiting access to law books and legal assistance); Johnson v.
Avery, 393 U.S. 483, 486-87 (1969) (holding that corrections officers cannot impede access
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heard reports of widespread mistreatment and degrading conditions, and
overhauled the "trusty" guard systems in Mississippi, Texas, and Arkansas.s
By 1976, a judge in Alabama had found most prisons in the state "unfit for
human habitation,"5 7 and two years later, a federal judge, "shocked" by "dark,
dirty, and totally isolated" psychiatric cells in some Pennsylvania prisons,
found conditions "constitut[ing] treatment so inhumane and degrading as to
amount to cruel and unusual punishment."58 By 1984, twenty-four percent of
state prisons were under court order.59 Litigation by prisoners and advocates
led to critical reforms of prison conditions .o For a time, noting those gains,
courts were able to defend against accusations of judicial activism.
Nevertheless, by the eighties and early nineties, critics gained the upper hand,
prompting a return to a quasi-"hands off' policy by both the judiciary and the
legislature.6 Prisoner litigation had ballooned: in 1990, prisoners filed more
to courts for a writ of habeas corpus); Ex parte Hull, 312 U.S. 546, 549 (1941) (expanding
habeas rights).
56. "Trusty" or "trustee" guard systems were systems in which prisoners were armed and
authorized to guard other inmates. These systems led to widespread abuse. They were once
compulsory under Mississippi law, see Miss. CODE ANN. § 47-5-143 (1972), and were in wide
use in the South, see Ruiz v. Estelle, 503 F. Supp. 1265, 1383-84 (S.D. Tex. 1980); Holt, 309
F. Supp. at 373-76. See also Gates v. Collier, 5o F.2d 1291 (5th Cir. 1974) (eliminating the
trusty system at Mississippi State Penitentiary, also called "Parchman Farm").
S7. See Brill, supra note 47, at 646 (citing Pugh v. Locke, 406 F. Supp. 318, 323-24 (M.D. Ala.
1976), rev'd in part sub nom. Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 781 (1978)); see also Locke, 4o6 F.
Supp. at 324 (describing testimony of a public health officer who recommended that the
prisons be "closed and condemned as an imminent danger to the health of the individuals
exposed to them").
58. Imprisoned Citizens Union v. Shapp, 451 F. Supp. 893, 898 (E.D. Pa. 1978) ("[W]e were
genuinely shocked by the dark, dirty, and totally isolated conditions we observed.").
s9. Schlanger, supra note 5o, at 2004.
6o. See Brill, supra note 47, at 646; Schlanger, supra note 5o, at 2018-19, 2028-29 (describing
efforts at Attica and elsewhere to improve prison conditions); see also John J. Dilulio, Jr.,
Conclusion: What Judges Can Do To Improve Prisons and Jails, in COURTS, CORRECTIONS, AND
THE CONSTITUTION: THE IMPACT OF JUDICIAL INTERVENTION ON PRISONS AND JAILS 287, 291
(John J. Dilulio, Jr. ed., 1990) (noting that "in most cases it is ... futile to assert that such
improvements would have been made, or made as quickly, in the absence of judicial
intervention").
61. See, e.g., Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 355-56 (1996) (holding that the district court's failure
to identify anything more than isolated instances of actual injury rendered its finding of a
systemic Bounds violation invalid). In Casey, Justice Scalia wrote that Bounds "does not
guarantee inmates the wherewithal to transform themselves into litigating engines capable
of filing everything from shareholder derivative actions to slip-and-fall claims." Id. at 355; see
also Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 344-52 (1981) (calling crowded prison conditions
"part of the penalty that criminal offenders pay for their offenses"); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S.




than 24,ooo civil rights cases in federal district court, up from 2,267 twenty
years earlier. By the mid-nineties, "state prisoners challenging the conditions of
their confinement accounted for the single largest category of civil lawsuits
filed in U.S. district courts.",6 1 In 1996, prisoners brought 41,302 lawsuits, or
more than one in six federal lawsuits filed that year.
B. Passing the PLRA
Against this backdrop, a coalition of conservative senators introduced the
PLRA, billed in home districts as a means to reduce the "crushing burden" of
"frivolous prisoner lawsuits."6" Advocates of the proposed legislation,
including the National Association of Attorneys General, compiled "Top Ten
Inmate Lawsuits" lists including soon-to-be-infamous lawsuits over chunky
peanut butter and bad haircuts." Legislators justified the proposal by pointing
to prisoners' low success rate in court, 6 arguing that the data showed that only
a miniscule percentage of prisoner lawsuits had "enough merit to reach trial."6 7
Prisoner advocates, including Judge Newman of the Second Circuit, objected
to these characterizations, arguing that the "poster child" cases were atypical at
best, and on investigation, far more meritorious than the bill's proponents
answered is not whose plan is best, but in what branch of the Government is lodged the
authority to initially devise the plan."); Mark Tushnet & Larry Yackle, Symbolic Statutes and
Real Laws: The Pathologies of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act and the Prison
Litigation Reform Act, 47 DuKE L.J. 1, 12-19 (1997) (describing a Republican campaign to
counter "judicial activism").
62. Ostrom et al., supra note 48, at 1525.
63. Id. Prisoners enjoyed the lowest plaintiff win-rate of all federal court filings, less than fifteen
percent. Margo Schlanger, Inmate Litigation, 116 HARv. L. REV. 1555, 1557, 1597-98 (2003).
These statistics do not include habeas claims. Id. at 1558 n.4.
64. 141 CONG. REC. 27,042 (1995) (statement of Sen. Orrin Hatch); see also id. at 38,276 (1995)
(statement of Sen. Jon Kyl) (complaining about prisoner suits); id. at 26,554 (1995)
(statement of Sen. Spencer Abraham) (same).
65. Id. at S14,413-19 (daily ed. Sept. 27, 1995) (statements of Sen. Bob Dole, Sen. Orrin Hatch &
Sen. Jon Kyl) (giving examples of "frivolous" suits); see also id. at 27,045 (1995) (statement
of Sen. Jon Kyl) (entering two lists of "frivolous" inmate lawsuits into the record); Vacco
Targets Frivolous Lawsuits Filed by Inmates, BUFFALO NEWS, June 13, 1995, at A4 (describing
attacks on prisoner suits by attorneys general). See generally Schlanger, supra note 63, at 1568
(describing lobbying efforts and collecting senators' statements about ostensibly "frivolous"
suits).
66. Ostrom et al., supra note 48, at 1526.
67. See, e.g., 141 CONG. REC. S14,418 (daily ed. Sept. 27, 1995) (statement of Sen. Orrin Hatch)
("[O]nly a scant 3.1 percent [of inmate lawsuits] have enough validity to reach trial.").
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suggested.
Drafters and supporters of the PLRA repeatedly affirmed that they did not
wish to obstruct the filing of legitimate constitutional claims evincing no
physical injury.69 Congressional debates on the statute focused on limiting
"'non-meritorious' and 'frivolous' inmate litigation" 7o by designing structural
barriers to constrain prisoners who "file free lawsuits in response to almost any
perceived slight or inconvenience." 7' Notably, senators underscored that "the
legislation would not prevent legitimate claims and would actually 'help
protect convicted criminals' constitutional rights,"' explicitly distinguishing
between wasteful claims and claims concerning "actual violations."72
68. Judge Jon Newman of the Second Circuit objected to the characterization of three ostensibly
"frivolous" lawsuits by a group of attorneys general in a letter to the New York Times. See
Dennis C. Vacco et al., Letter to the Editor, Free the Courts from Frivolous Prisoner Suits, N.Y.
TiMEs, Mar. 3, 1995, http://www.nytimes.con-V1995/o3/o3/opinion/1-free-the-courts-from
-frivolous-prisoner-suits-486495.html. Judge Newman showed that, on further
investigation, each of the cases was far less frivolous than the attorneys general were
suggesting and labeled their descriptions as "at best highly misleading and, sometimes,
simply false." Jon 0. Newman, Foreword: Pro Se Prisoner Litigation: Looking for Needles in
Haystacks, 62 BROOK. L. REV. 519, 520 (1996). A coalition of prisoner rights advocates filed a
competing list. ACLU Nat'l Prison Project, The Top Ten Non-Frivolous Lawsuits
Filed by Prisoners, ACLU OR. (Feb. 11, 1996), http://archive.acluor.org/archive/Leg_2005
/pdf/Leg_20o5 HB2140 topao.pdf. For descriptions of this history, see Shay & Kalb, supra
note 49; and Schlanger, supra note 5o. For explanation of Schlanger's (non)-"deluge"
statistics, see Schlanger, supra note 5o, at 1585-87 nn.86-87. See also note 5o and
accompanying text.
69. See Royal v. Kautzky, 375 F. 3d 720, 730 (8th Cir. 2004) (Heaney, J., dissenting) (noting that
the drafters specified that they did not wish to obstruct meritorious claims); Siggers-El v.
Barlow, 433 F. Supp. 2d 811, 816 (E.D. Mich. 2006) (claiming that Congress intended to
limit only frivolous suits); Percival v. Rowley, No. 1:02-CV-363, 2005 WL 2572034 (W.D.
Mich. Oct. 12, 2005) (same).
7o. Royal, 375 F.3d at 730 (Heaney, J., dissenting).
71. Id. (quoting 141 CONG. REc. S14 ,4 18 (1995) (statement of Sen. Jon Kyl)).
72. Id. (quoting 141 CONG. REC. S14,418 (1995) (statement of Sen. Orrin Hatch)) (distinguishing
between wasteful claims and claims concerning "actual violations of prisoners' rights"). See
generally Schlanger, supra note 63, at 1565-69 (reviewing the debate in Congress). There is
an argument that members of Congress were not attuned to the potential consequences of
certain provisions, including the prior physical injury requirement. Senator Kennedy, for
instance, famously complained that the legislation had received only one hearing, and that
despite repeated professions by sponsors and supporters on Capitol Hill that the legislation
would do nothing to inhibit meritorious claims, the bill installed no procedural safeguards
to ensure that meritorious claims would be protected. See also supra notes 64-69 (reviewing
the legislative history). But others have suggested that Congress cared little about limiting
meritorious claims, and that the bill represented a political attack on judges, like Norma
Shapiro and William Wayne Justice, who were perceived as "activists." See, e.g., Theodore




The bill passed. As enacted, the PLRA created a series of procedural
barriers to prisoner lawsuits. In addition to instituting the prior physical injury
requirement, the statute imposes filing fees on indigent prisoners, where fees
for similarly impoverished free persons would be waived; it imposes barriers to
filing in forma pauperis; it requires that prisoners exhaust administrative
remedies before pursuing action in court;74 and it severely limits attorneys'
fees-often to a mere $1.50-even for successful suits. 7s The statute enables
courts to dismiss suits for frivolity, maliciousness, or failure to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted. 6
The PLRA was "successful" on at least two counts: symbolically, in
showing constituents that their representatives in Congress had "done
something about a problem,"7  and substantively, in reducing prisoner
litigation. Indeed, in the four years after passage, the total number of prisoner
lawsuits fell by more than 40%, from more than 41,000 to about 24,400,
despite a simultaneous 23% increase in the incarcerated population.'5 By 20o6,
prison litigation had been reduced by 60%.79
But those "successes" came at considerable cost.
the Immediate Termination Provisions of the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 56 WASH. & LEE 1.
REV. 969, 980 (1999) ("[F]loor debates specifically condemned efforts by Judge Norma L.
Shapiro of the Eastern District of Pennsylvania to impose a population cap on Philadelphia's
prisons because of overcrowding"); The Prison Litigation Reform Act and the Antiterrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act: Implications for Federal District Judges, 115 HARV. L. REv. 1846, 1855
(2002) (noting that one committee witness cited Judge Justice's "control of the Texas prison
system" to argue that "judges in these cases have gone way beyond remedying specific,
documentable violations" (quoting Prison Reform: Enhancing the Effectiveness of Incarceration:
Hearing on S. 3, S. 38, S. 886, S. 93o, and H.R. 667 Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 1o4th
Cong. 43 (1995) (statement of John J. Dilulio, Jr., Professor of Politics and Public Affairs,
Princeton University))); see also Tushnet & Yackle, supra note 61, at 23 (arguing that the bill
was a symbolic statute designed so that members could tell their constituents they had
"done something about a problem").
73. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e) (20o6).
74. Id. § 1997e(a).
75. Id. § 1997e(d); see infra note 129 (discussing the mechanism by which this provision can limit
fees to $1.50).
76. Id. § 1997e(c).
77. See Tushnet & Yackle, supra note 61, at 23.
78. Ostrom et al., supra note 48, at 1532 fig1, 1525-26; Schlanger, supra note 63, at 1559-60.
79. Schlanger & Shay, supra note 46, at 141-42.
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C. A Mismatched Solution for a Misunderstood Problem
The PLRA tragically mischaracterized the nature of prison litigation. True,
prisoner filings had increased from the 1970s to the 1990s. But the increase in
litigation tracked neatly the explosion in the prison population during the same
period. Because increases in the filing rate for federal civil rights were
"primarily associated, in nearly every state, with the growing incarcerated
population," it would be, as Margo Schlanger has noted, equally inappropriate
to speak of a "deluge" of inmate filings as to speak of a "'deluge' of inmate
requests for food."so The population trend had manifold causes: changes in
sentencing requirements, sentencing enhancements for recidivists, the
nationwide decline in mental health services, and the War on Drugs.8' And
population growth, in turn, created problems of its own, which themselves
spawned litigation: overcrowding led to poor hygiene, substandard housing,
and lack of exercise, abuse, and neglect."
Moreover, prisoner suits before the PLRA were far less problematic than
legislators claimed. Indeed, "[n]umerous researchers who have conducted
systematic reviews of case records have concluded that a large portion of
inmates 'present serious claims that are supported factually,' and that even
'most "frivolous" cases are neither fanciful, ridiculous, nor vexing.'"8 Although
success rates were low compared to other categories of federal cases, they were
so. Schlanger, supra note 63, at 1586-87; see also Glenn C. Loury & Bruce Western, The Challenge
of Mass Incarceration in America, DAEDALUS, Summer 2010, at 5-7 ("With roughly 5 percent
of the world's population, the United States currently confines about 25 percent of the
world's prison inmates."). See generally Judith Resnik, Tiers, 57 S. CAL. L. REV. 837, 939-64
(1984) (reviewing twenty years of data on prisoner litigation rates and charting government
attempts to distinguish habeas from "conditions" claims, and reviewing the normative
consequences of considering the volume of prisoner filings).
81. Brill, supra note 47, at 647 & nn.13-16 (reviewing causes of growth in the prison population).
82. See Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910 (2011) (litigation regarding overcrowding in California
prisons); Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337 (1981) (litigation challenging "double celling" in
crowded Ohio prisons); Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d 1237 (9 th Cir. 1982) (litigation
challenging overcrowding, lack of medical care, and violence, and disregard for inmate
safety, ability to exercise, and living conditions).
83. Schlanger, supra note 63, at 1692 (quoting Howard B. Eisenberg, Rethinking Prisoner Civil
Rights Cases and the Provision of Counsel, 17 S. ILL. U. L.J. 417, 440 (1993)); see also Theodore
Eisenberg, Section 1983: Doctrinal Foundations and an Empirical Study, 67 CORNELL L. REV.
482, 538 (1982) ("[M]ost prisoner section 1983 complaints were not plainly trivial assertions
implicating little or no federal interest."); Schlanger, supra note 63, at 1573 ("[T]he best
evidence available demonstrates that the . . . major accusation-that typical inmate





"far from miniscule," with 15% of prisoner suits ending in "some kind of
negotiated disposition or in litigated victory for the plaintiff."81 In all, a "close
look uncovers . . . a very different prisoner litigation problem than that
animating the PLRA's supporters' account."8 s
As noted earlier, legislators had pointed to prisoners' limited success in
court as evidence of the absurdity of prisoner claims." But structural factors,
not the underlying weakness of prisoner claims, explain why prisoners
achieved so little success in court.1 Prisoners faced, then as now, the range of
barriers meeting poor populations generally: the lack of lawyers available to
represent low income populations in civil matters; underresourced and
undertrained counsel for indigent criminal defendants; barriers to access for
people with physical and psychiatric disabilities; barriers imposed by court
decisions and statutes; and at times, mandatory reliance on alternative dispute
resolution."
More importantly, prisoner litigants face limitations specific to their status
as prisoners. Among others, no lawyer receiving any funding from the Legal
Services Corporation is permitted to represent prisoners." Prisoner litigants
who reach court encounter a generalized deference, both de jure and de facto,
to prison officials. Prisoner civil rights claims are governed by the deferential
standard established in Turner v. Safley, with which courts have maintained
84. Schlanger, supra note 63, at 1692.
85. Id. at 1693.
86. See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
8. Inmate litigants face obstacles ranging from "a jaded or . . . very hurried judiciary,"
Schlanger, supra note 63, at 1692, to "an extremely high decision standard or persuasive
burden (so high that over twenty percent of cases that meet it are actually egregious enough
to prompt the award of punitive damages)," id. at 1692-93 (footnote omitted); "plaintiffs'
poor information," id. at 1693; "defendants' strong perception that settling tends to have the
externality of promoting additional filings," id.; "and the antagonistic milieu of corrections,
which discourages 'capitulating to inmates,"' id. at 1692; to a lack of representation (95.6%
of inmate civil rights cases are pro se, compared with 10.1% across the rest of the federal civil
docket), see id. at 1609 tbl.II.D. Damages for prisoner litigants tended, pre-PLRA,
to be extremely low, due in large part to the ordinary rules of tort damages, which
better compensate the kinds of economic losses not typically incurred by inmates,
and perhaps also to the more idiosyncratic problem faced by pro se plaintiffs trying
simultaneously to act as effective litigators and demonstrate devastating injury.
Id. at 1693.
88. David S. Udell & Rebekah Diller, Access to the Courts: An Essay for the Georgetown University
Law Center Conference on the Independence of the Courts, 95 GEO. L.J. 1127, 1130-52 (2007)
(reviewing factors). See generally Boston, supra note 13, at 433 (discussing the burden of
filing fees on an indigent prison population).
8g. Schlanger, supra note 63, at 1654.
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that "[s]ubjecting the day-to-day judgments of prison officials to an inflexible,
strict scrutiny analysis would seriously hamper their ability to anticipate
security problems and to adopt innovative solutions to the intractable problems
of prison administration."' 0 Turner creates an especially high bar for challenges
to prison regulation, upholding challenges only if the relationship of a policy to
a governmental objective is "so remote as to render the policy arbitrary or
irrational."" Matched with this, prisoner suits are often met with a generalized
suspicion on the part of courts, some of which perceive retaliation claims by
prisoners as particularly "prone to abuse,"" warranting "skepticism and
particular care," since prisoners could cry abuse in the face of any decision they
disliked."
II. HARM TO PLAINTIFFS: IMPEDING ACCESS TO THE COURTS
In the face of existing generic barriers to court access, the PLRA created
new ones. Among these, the physical injury requirement has been interpreted
to create a barrier not only for classic emotional claims, but for constitutional
violations, as illustrated in Section II.A. Section II.B shows that the
requirement sets in motion a cascade of access-blocking procedures, which
operate to exclude prisoner claims for violations of intangible constitutional
rights, from retaliation to harms to freedom of religion."
90. 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987). See generally supra note 61 (discussing limitations on prisoners'
rights to litigate).
91. See, e.g., Freeman v. Tex. Dep't of Criminal Justice, 369 F.3d 854, 861 (5th Cir. 2004) (citing
Turner, 482 U.S. at 89-90).
92. Graham v. Henderson, 89 F.3d 75, 79 (2d Cir. 1996) (quoting Flaherty v. Coughlin, 713 F.2d
10, 13 (2d Cir. 1983)).
g. Dawes v. Walker, 239 F.3d 489, 491 (2d Cir. 2001).
94. See Thompson v. Carter, 284 F.3d 411, 416-17 (2d Cit. 2002) (holding that the physical
injury requirement bars compensatory damages for a violation of due process rights);
Searles v. Van Bebber, 251 F. 3d 869, 876 (loth Cit. 2001) (holding that the physical injury
requirement bars compensatory damages for a violation of religious rights); Allah v. Al-
Hafeez, 226 F.3d 247, 250 ( 3d Cir. 2000) (same); Davis v. District of Columbia, 158 F.3d
1342, 1348 (D.C. Cit. 1998) (holding that the physical injury requirement bars compensatory
damages for a violation of constitutional privacy rights); Carter v. Hubert, No. 07-614, 2011
WL 616723, at *2 (M.D. La. Jan. 20, 201) (denying compensatory damages for a First
Amendment violation absent a showing of prior physical injury); Holloway v. Bizzaro, 571
F. Supp. 2d 1270, 1272 (S.D. Fla. 2oo8) (denying compensatory damages for separate




A. The Circuit Split
The federal circuits have been caught in a protracted definitional battle over
how to taxonomize First Amendment injuries, like retaliation against prisoners
for petitioning the courts, 95 for the purposes of the prior physical injury
requirement. As interpreted by about half of the federal circuits,96 petition
violations, including but not limited to retaliation, are understood as "not
physical" and thus "mental or emotional," leaving the prisoner who is
punished for communicating with the courts-and who is likely unable to
show any physical effects of his chilled communication 9 7- entirely without
remedy.9' The pages to follow will refer to this as the "restrictive"
interpretation. The remaining circuits object to the characterization of First
Amendment injuries as "mental or emotional,"" arguing that claims for First
9s. See supra notes 18-23 and accompanying text.
g6. The federal circuit courts are roughly evenly divided over the applicability of the prior
physical injury requirement, 42 U.S.C. 5 1997e(e) (2oo6), to First Amendment claims. The
Third, Eighth, Tenth, and D.C. Circuits have interpreted 5 1997e(e) to preclude
compensatory damages in prisoner suits alleging constitutional violations without a prior
showing of physical injury. Under this theory, prisoners bringing First Amendment claims
typically are left with only nominal (often $1) damages. Among this group, the Third,
Eighth, and Tenth Circuits read the PLRA to permit, at least theoretically, punitive damages
for a First Amendment violation, but the D.C. Circuit reads the provision to bar punitive
damages, holding that "Congress's evident intent [to curtail frivolous prisoner suits] would
be thwarted if prisoners could surmount § 1997e(e) simply by adding a claim for punitive
damages." Davis, 158 F.3d at 1348 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (analyzing a Fourth Amendment claim).
For other circuits adopting the same argument about punitive damages, see Royal v.
Kautzky, 375 F.3d 720, 723-25 (8th Cir. 2004); Searles, 251 F.3d at 876; Allah, 226 F. 3d at 250-
51; and Zehner v. Trigg, 133 F.3d 459, 462 (7 th Cir. 1997).
97- See discussion infra notes 134-135.
g8. Because of the PLRA's tandem-fee limitation, plaintiffs occasionally receive $i in nominal
damages and $1.so in attorneys' fees. See supra note 75 and accompanying text; infra notes
120-127 and accompanying text.
99. The Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits, as well as district courts in the First and
Second Circuits, have taken this view, holding that the physical injury requirement of
§ 1997e(e) does not apply when the underlying constitutional right either inherently lacks a
physical component or possesses intrinsic value independent of any secondary (physical,
mental, or emotional) harms.
Courts have applied this reading to constitutional claims involving, among other
rights, freedom from illegal confinement, religious freedom, equal protection, procedural
due process, and, as here, freedom from retaliation for exercising First Amendment speech
and petition rights. Robertson, supra note ii, at 635-39 (collecting cases). Textually, this
reasoning turns on the language of § 1997e(e), which requires a showing of physical injury
in suits "for mental or emotional injury." 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e) (emphasis added). These
courts have not applied 5 1997e(e)'s physical injury requirement where they understand the
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Amendment violations "are not brought to redress [mental, emotional, or
physical] injuries . . . [but] to redress the actual violation of the right."'oo First
Amendment injuries, by this permissive interpretation, "are abridged the
moment a state silences free speech, or prevents a citizen from following the
precepts of his religion," and "occur at the time of the deprivation, not at a later
time when the physical or emotional harm manifests."'o'
The restrictive reading understands the PLRA as categorizing the range of
potential harms in the manner of a standard tort: injuries are either physical, or
they are "mental or emotional." Intuition suggests this dichotomy must be
wrong, but as the experience of several circuits has shown, the two-category
heuristic is powerful and has encouraged the shoehorning of intangible injuries
into inappropriate frames. To predicate recovery for retaliation on a showing of
physical injury is to make two mistakes, discussed in the sections to follow:
first, to imagine nonphysicallO2 violations as less significant than physical
violations (the message implicit in the subordination of the "mental" to the
"physical"); and second, to imagine retaliation as an injury to the individual
alone (the message implicit in placing retaliation in the same framework as
mental and physical pain). The first is a tragedy, and outmoded; the second
may be more threatening for remaining en mode.
suit not to befor a "mental or emotional injury," butfor the intangible harm inhering in the
constitutional violation itself. See, e.g., Canell v. Lightner, 143 F.3d 1210, 1213 (9 th Cir. 1998)
(understanding the prisoner's suit not to befor mental or emotional harm, but for "violation
of [the petitioner's] First Amendment rights").
Other circuits' holdings have adopted similar reasoning. See, e.g., Hutchins v. McDaniels,
512 F. 3d 193, 198 (5 th Cir. 2007); Calhoun v. DeTella, 319 F.3d 936, 940 (7 th Cir. 2003)
("[T]he deprivation of the constitutional right is itself a cognizable injury, regardless of any
resulting mental or emotional injury."); Williams v. Ollis, No. 99-2168, 2000 WL 1434459, at
*2 (6th Cir. 2000) (noting that the "plaintiffs First Amendment retaliation claim [wa]s not
precluded" by § 1997e(e)); Robinson v. Page, 170 F.3d 747, 748 (7th Cir. 1999) ("It would
be a serious mistake to interpret section 1997e(e) to require a showing of physical injury in
all prisoner civil rights suits."). District courts in the First and Second Circuits have issued
similar holdings. See, e.g., Shaheed-Muhammad v. Dipaolo, 393 F. Supp. 2d 8o, 107-08 (D.
Mass. 2005) (Gertner, J.) (holding that § 1997e(e) is "inapplicable to suits alleging
constitutional injuries" because such violations are "independent injur[ies] that [are]
immediately cognizable and outside the purview of § 1997e(e)"); id. ("[T]he harm that is
constitutionally actionable is the violation of intangible rights-regardless of actual physical
or emotional injury. . . ." (quoting Shaheed-Muhammad v. Dipaolo, 138 F. Supp. 2d 99, 107
(D. Mass. zoo)) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Birth v. Pepe, No. 98-CV-1291, 1999
WL 684162, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. July 21, 1999); Amaker v. Haponik, No. 98-CIV-2663, 1999 WL
76798, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 17, 1999).
ioo. Royal, 375 F.3d at 730 (Heaney, J., dissenting).
101. Id. (quoting Shaheed-Muhammad, 138 F. Supp. 2d at ioi).





At a doctrinal level, applying the physical injury requirement to First
Amendment violations, like retaliation, conflates "deprivation [s] of an
intangible right"o3 with tangible losses. While petition violations "may be
accompanied by psychological or even physical injury,"' 4 such injuries are not
by themselves psychological or physical, but rather "inhere [] in the retaliatory
conduct itself."'o Retaliation for the exercise of a constitutional right,
independent of any external symptoms, "is itself a violation of the
Constitution. ,,o6 To categorize First Amendment injuries as "mental or
emotional" is to misunderstand the "purpose behind the First Amendment,"
which is "not concerned with preventing physical abuse by government agents,
but rather with the invasion of the 'sphere of intellect and spirit which it is the
purpose of the First Amendment . .. to reserve from all official control.""0 7
Even were the courts to classify retaliation as a "mental or emotional
injury," this classification would be inconsistent with tort law principles, which
have historically differentiated between "mental or emotional" and intangible
injuries,os and which make available remedies for forms of emotional distress
103. Royal, 375 F.3d at 730 (Heaney, J., dissenting).
104. Id. (stating that the harm attaches "at the time of the deprivation, not at a later time when
the physical or emotional harm manifests").
105. Dixon v. Brown, 38 F-3 d 379, 379 (8th Cir. 1994).
106. Thaddeus-X v. Blatter, 175 F.3d 378, 394 (6th Cir. 1999); see also id. ("As long as the injury is
'distinct and palpable' rather than abstract, conjectural, or hypothetical, it is sufficient to
confer standing." (quoting Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984))).
107. Shaheed-Muhammad v. Dipaolo, 138 F. Supp. 2d 99, io8 (D. Mass. 2001) (quoting W. Va.
State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943)).
i08. Tort law differentiates between "mental or emotional" distress and intangible harms like
injuries to reputation or injuries to liberty. See JOHN BOSTON, THE PRISON LITIGATION
REFORM ACT: PREPARED FOR SECOND CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS STAFF ATTORNEYs'
ORIENTATION 105-o8 (2004), http://www.wnylc.net/pb/docs/plra2ciro4.pdf. Defamation
law, for instance, explicitly differentiates mental and emotional injury from injuries like
damage to reputation or alienation of associates. False imprisonment cases differentiate
mental or emotional injury from the harm inherent in the loss of liberty. Id. at 105-o6
& nn.473-74; see also id. at 1o6 ("The damages recoverable for loss of liberty for the period
spent in a wrongful confinement are separable from damages recoverable for such injuries as
physical harm, embarrassment, or emotional suffering; even absent such other injuries, an
award of several thousand dollars may be appropriate simply for several hours' loss of liberty."
(emphasis added) (citing Kerman v. New York, 374 F. 3d 93, 125-26 (2d Cit. 2004))). The
comparison to tort law is apt, as § 1983 creates a "species of tort liability" for those suffering
constitutional violations at the hands of persons acting under color of state law, and assigns
damages "according to principles derived from the common law of torts." Memphis Cmty.
1047
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
lacking physical components."o9 Moreover, the rationale in tort for physical
predicates does not apply to intangible injuries. The physical injury
requirement of the PLRA echoes the rule at common law that plaintiffs in
negligence actions can only recover for emotional distress stemming from a
"physical impact, ". a rule reflecting the concern that emotional harm is
difficult to verify and difficult to value. Physical injury, in such a framework, is
said to "vouch for the asserted emotional injury.".." Whatever one thinks of
such a rule as applied to emotional harms, it has no relevance to intangible
harms; physical injuries neither "vouch" for the genuineness of an intangible
injury nor relate to the injury in any material way.
Under the prior physical injury requirement, retaliation preceded by a
punch might be actionable, but retaliation absent the punch might not be,
implicating procedural fairness or arbitrariness concerns on at least three levels.
First, the provision conditions the enjoyment of one constitutional right on a
predicate unrelated to demonstrating the legitimacy of the violation, raising
due process concerns." In imposing conditions without meaningful
relationship to the underlying right, the provision creates a hierarchy of rights
without constitutional sanction or justification other than docket clearing. In
the process, the provision minimizes the importance of intangible injuries,
Sch. Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299,305-o6 (1986) (citing Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 253
(1978)).
iog. For instance, tort law makes available remedies for intentional infliction of emotional
distress. See, e.g., William Glaberson, After Stillbirth, Courts Try To Put a Price on a Mother's
Anguish, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 23, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2oin/o8/24/nyregiorVin
-stillbirth-malpractice-cases-courts-try-to-put-price-on-mothers-anguish.html (noting that
courts are increasingly recognizing the importance of recovery for psychological and
emotional injury). To subordinate psychological injury to physical injury contravenes a line
of Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, similar enough in its underpinnings to draw parallels
to the present context, holding that a physical injury is not necessary for a showing of a
constitutional violation. See, e.g., Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (holding that
denationalization of U.S. citizens as criminal punishment violated the Eighth Amendment).
The Trop court reasoned that "[t]here may be involved no physical mistreatment, no
primitive torture. There is instead the total destruction of the individual's status in
organized society. It is a form of punishment more primitive than torture, for it destroys for
the individual the political existence that was centuries in the development." Id.
11o. See, e.g., Lee v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 533 S.E.2d 82, 84 (Ga. 2000) ("In a claim
concerning negligent conduct, a recovery for emotional distress is allowed only where there
is some impact on the plaintiff, and that impact must be a physical injury." (quoting
Ryckeley v. Callaway, 412 S.E.2d 826, 826 (Ga. 1992)).
i. Dawes v. Walker, 239 F.3d 489, 495 (2d Cir. 2001) (Walker, J., concurring); see also id. at
494-97 (discussing the theory of the PLRA's physical injury requirement).
112. The injury of concern is the retaliation, not the punch; the retaliation is as much a




enshrouds retaliatory behavior in a kind of immunity, and potentially blocks
legitimate claims. Second, the requirement means that not all identical
intangible violations against prisoners are regarded equally, thus raising
arbitrariness concerns at another level, and differentiating among individual
prisoners in possible violation of the equal protection guarantee. Third, the
requirement, as interpreted by the limiting circuits, conditions prisoners'
constitutional rights in a manner distinct from free persons' constitutional
rights. As noted below, some have argued that to deny to prisoners certain
claims available to others, whether in the context of retaliation or in the context
of other threats - the threat of violence, for instance, as opposed to actual
violence-could violate prisoners' constitutional right to equal protection."3
Although constitutional rights are regularly constrained in the prison
context," 4 the limitations here extend beyond Turner deference"s and carry the
potential to limit actual freedoms beyond justifiable penological ends.
C. Blocking Individual Rights: The Individual and Cascade Mechanisms
The physical injury requirement constructs rigid barriers to prisoner safety
by creating the possibility that officials might punish or injure prisoners
without fear of reprisal. This Section describes four of the mechanisms by
which the requirement creates such a result. Certain of these mechanisms flow
from the requirement itself, and others arise from the interaction between the
physical injury requirement and other provisions.
First, as noted earlier, courts espousing a restrictive reading of the PLRA
read S 1997e(e) to limit the availability of compensatory damages absent a
"prior showing of physical injury,"" 6  leaving prisoners subject to
unconstitutional retaliation -even weeks or months in solitary confinement, a
113. See sources cited supra note 32.
114. Prisoners lose their Second Amendment right to bear arms, for instance, and their First
Amendment right to freedom of assembly is highly restricted. But see Wolff v. McDonnell,
418 U.S. 539, 555 (1974) ("[A] prisoner is not wholly stripped of constitutional protections
when he is imprisoned for crime."); Lowrance v. Coughlin, 862 F. Supp. 1090,
1121 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (stating that prison officials have discretionary authority, but
"'[f]ederal courts must be especially vigilant to [e]nsure that all citizens-even the most
unpopular-are guaranteed' the protections secured by the Constitution" (quoting Santiago
v. Miles, 774 F. Supp. 775, 778 (W.D.N.Y. 1991))).
11s. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987) ("[W]hen a prison regulation impinges on inmates'
constitutional rights, the regulation is valid if it is reasonably related to legitimate
penological interests.").
116. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e) (20o6); see cases cited supra notes 96, 99.
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punishment some have termed "torture"11 7 -with nothing for their suffering.
Without damages, even a judgment in the prisoner's favor has little deterrent
value and renders prison officials effectively immune for their behavior.
Second, although under most readings nominal and punitive damages and
injunctive relief theoretically remain available to plaintiffs, none is sufficient to
deter abuse or to cure the problems with the restrictive reading. Punitive
damages in prisoner retaliation suits are virtually never awarded, commonly
leaving prisoners with only $1 in nominal damages."' Injunctive relief can be a
similarly pyrrhic remedy, as many prisoners are transferred before the close of
their suits, and many implicated staff leave the prisons or are reassigned."
And nominal damages pose problems of their own, in this context. The
availability of nominal damages"o allows proponents of the restrictive reading
to argue that prisoner litigants are being "compensated" for their injuries.
Since intangible constitutional violations can be difficult to monetize,
constitutional litigants outside prisons are often granted symbolic awards of
$1. Put simply, the argument goes, if Jeffery Royal left court with $i, and
retaliation is an "intangible" right, was Royal not appropriately compensated?
If so, why is the restrictive interpretation problematic? In Memphis Community
School District v. Stachura, the Supreme Court held that courts may not grant
damages awards based on the "abstract 'importance' of a constitutional
right,""' but only based on the value of the individual's suffering.m' But the
117. The literature on the effects of solitary confinement is extensive. Several writers have
equated solitary confinement with torture. See, e.g., Michael B. Mushlin, Unlocking the
Courthouse Door: Removing the Barrier of the PLRA's Physical Injury Requirement To Permit
Meaningful judicial Oversight ofAbuses in Supermax Prisons and Isolation Units, 24 FED. SENT'G
REP. 268, 274 nn.38-39 (2012); Atul Gawande, Annals of Human Rights: Hellhole,
NEw YORKER, Mar. 30, 2oo9, http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2009/03/30/09033ofa
fact-gawande. See generally Stuart Grassian, Psychiatric Effects of Solitary Confinement, 22
WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 325, 331 (20o6); Mushlin, supra, at 273 n.29 (reviewing studies on the
psychological effects of solitary confinement).
118. Punitive damages exist to punish reckless or malicious conduct, but are rarely awarded to
prisoners. Cohn, supra note 3, at 3oo. But see Schlanger, supra note 63, at 1591-92 (noting
that, although inmates fare worse than other federal civil litigants by all metrics, in the rare
cases in which they win at trial, one in five wins punitive damages).
119. See Cohn, supra note 3, at 323 n.135.
120. But see infra note 213 (noting that some circuits read the provision to bar all damages,
including nominal damages, and some adopt an incongruous but ostensibly "saving"
construction of the provision permitting nominal but not compensatory damages).
121. 477 U.S. 299, 310 (1986); see also id. at 303 (rejecting a jury instruction telling jurors to
consider, in calculating the damages award, the "importance of the right in our system of
government, the role which this right has played in the history of our republic, [and) the




Stachura court made clear that "compensatory damages may include not only
out-of-pocket loss and other monetary harms, but also such injuries as
'impairment of reputation . . , personal humiliation, and mental anguish and
suffering."'" Thus Stachura stands not for the proposition that classically
nonmonetary "harms" cannot be monetized, but rather for the proposition that
damages must be calculated "to compensate persons for injuries that are caused
by the deprivation of constitutional rights," rather than to reflect the general
value of a right to society. In other words, after Carey v. Piphus and Stachura,
litigants - even prisoners - retained the right to prove the cost of a given injury
to themselves and to demonstrate that they were owed more than nominal
damages. Litigants did so prove, even in First Amendment cases' and even in
prison retaliation cases.' It is this right-the right to (attempt to) monetize
the violation of an intangible constitutional harm-that prisoners lose under
122. Stachura, 477 U.S. at 307 ("'[T]he basic purpose' of § 1983 damages is 'to compensate persons
for injuries that are caused by the deprivation of constitutional rights."' (quoting Carey v.
Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 254 (1978) (emphasis added))); see, e.g., Irish Lesbian & Gay Org. v.
Giuliani, 143 F-3d 638, 650 n.5 (2d Cit. 1998) (noting that "any recovery must be based on
actual loss" and that in the absence of such loss, the plaintiff could recover only nominal
damages).
123. Stachura, 477 U.S. at 307.
124. Id. (quoting Carey, 435 U.S. at 254).
125. See, e.g., Sallier v. Brooks, 343 F-3d 868, 88o (6th Cit. 2003) (upholding a jury award, in a
case involving the unlawful opening of legal mail, of $750 in compensatory damages for
each instance of the conduct); Goff v. Burton, 91 F.3d 188, 1192 (8th Cit. 1996) (upholding
an award of $io per day, or $2,250 in total, for a prisoner who lost privileges as a result of a
retaliatory transfer to a higher-security prison); City of Watseka v. Ill. Pub. Action Council,
796 F.2d 1547 (7th Cit. 1986) (upholding an award of $8,300 in damages, of which $5,000
was for the loss of the plaintiffs First Amendment rights), af'd, 479 U.S. 1048 (1987)
(mem.); Vanscoy v. Hicks, 691 F. Supp. 1336 (M.D. Ala. 1988) (awarding $50 for pretextual
exclusion from a religious service, even though the plaintiff did not demonstrate separate
mental anguish).
126. Lowrance v. Coughlin, 862 F. Supp. 1090, 1120-21 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (awarding $132,000 in
compensatory damages and $25,000 in punitive damages to a prisoner for repeated
retaliatory prison transfers, segregation, and cell searches).
Before the passage of the PLRA, § 1983 plaintiffs were not required to show physical
injury before recovering damages for mental, emotional, or intangible injury. For an
example of a pre-PLRA compensatory award for a First Amendment violation, see Trobaugh
v. Hall, 176 F. 3d 1087, 1o89 (8th Cit. 1999), which overturned the district court's award of
$1 for a prisoner's retaliatory placement in administrative segregation for exercising his
constitutional right to access the courts and remanded for an "appropriate" damage award,
somewhere "in the vicinity of $ioo per day." To secure compensatory damages before the
PLRA, a plaintiff had to demonstrate only actual - as distinct from "physical" - injury and a
causal connection between the injury and the defendant's action. See Stachura, 477 U.S. at
307; Carey, 435 U.S. at 262-64.
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the restrictive reading of § 1997e(e).117
The requirement thus is problematic despite the possible availability of
nominal damages. Nonprisoner litigants can recover for "actual damages"
resulting from First Amendment injuries, not merely "nominal damages."
Litigants must prove those damages, but they are entitled to prove them.
Barring prisoners from compensatory damages means that prisoners, under the
restrictive interpretation, are not permitted to prove the "actual harm" that
others are permitted to prove. This, in turn, means that under the restrictive
reading, some prisoners - those whose claims would have a monetized value
greater than $1, were they permitted to so demonstrate-are left
uncompensated for harms that society and the courts have deemed worthy of
compensation. Some have argued that such restrictions pose equal protection
problems, in denying remedies to prisoners that are available to other
litigants.' Equal protection aside, the restriction may limit the responsiveness
of prison officials to court findings of constitutional violations.
Third, the prior physical injury requirement interacts with other portions
of the PLRA to strengthen access barriers. For instance, some circuits have
interpreted the PLRA's fee limitations to mean that, where a plaintiff is
awarded only $1 in nominal damages, his or her attorney may receive only
$1.5o. This practice reverses the pre-PLRA practice of awarding fees to an
attorney who prevailed in the district court by obtaining either injunctive or
monetary relief, and interprets both the language of the PLRA and congressional
intent to amplify the effect of the limitation on compensatory damages."'
Critically, the limitation on attorneys' fees means that many attorneys will only
take clients with physical injuries, buttressing the barrier to access posed in
theory by the physical injury requirement with a barrier in fact.'30
Finally, prisoners hospitalized as a result of their injuries, for instance,
often cannot challenge those injuries because they miss unyielding deadlines
127. For a discussion of the permissible and impermissible restriction of remedies by Congress,
see infra Part IV.
128. See sources cited supra note 32.
129. See Royal v. Kautzky, 375 F.3d 720, 721-22, 725 (8th Cir. 2004) (awarding $1.50 in fees).
Courts espousing a restrictive reading of the PLRA read one section of the Act, § 1997e(d),
to eliminate, or to limit to $1.50, the attorney's fees, available under 42 U.S.C. § 19 88(b)
(20o6), which provides for an award of fees to prevailing parties in 42 U.S.C. § 1983 suits.
The restrictive reading chills meritorious claims and conflates two provisions, § 1997e(d)(i)
and § 1997e(d)(3), that Congress arguably never intended to conflate. The former allows
reasonable fees, the latter limits fees to 150% of the hourly rate for court-appointed counsel.
Scholars have criticized this result on fairness grounds. See, e.g., Schlanger, supra note 63, at
1655; Cohn, supra note 3, at 325-28.




for filing administrative grievances or court papers while in treatment. 3 ' The
PLRA's exhaustion requirement permits prisons to install "hyper-technical"
internal procedures, the requirements of which can frustrate even the most
sophisticated prisoner or lawyer.' Filing requirements are especially
problematic in light of the high rate of traumatic injury in prison, including
rape, which is understood outside the prison context to require especially
forgiving periods in which to file suit."' Courts can be stingy with
determinations of physical abuse,' and there is no consensus among the
courts as to what constitutes physical injury.' Together, such procedures can
131. The exhaustion requirement of the PLRA, 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (2006), permits prison
officials to design rigid and complex internal grievance procedures, and bars inmates from
filing suit until those avenues have been exhausted. See Hearing on H.R. 4109, supra note 12,
at 21 (statement of Stephen Bright, President, Southern Center for Human Rights)
(describing a case in which an inmate was beaten with a sock full of combination locks and
in which "it was argued that he could not file suit because of his failure to comply with the
[five-day] deadline [for filing a grievance]," even though he was unable to file because he
was "in and out of consciousness during that time"); id. at 20-22 (reviewing problems with
the exhaustion requirement); Schlanger, supra note 63, at 1650-54 (same); id. at 1653 n.332
(listing instances in which prisoners' cases were dismissed because they were hospitalized
during the entire grievance filing period).
132. Hearing on H.R. 4109, supra note 12, at 20-21 (statement of Stephen Bright, President,
Southern Center for Human Rights).
133. See, e.g., Andy Metzger, Sex-Abuse Statute Bill Heads to House, SENTINEL & ENTERPRISE
(Fitchburg, Mass.), July 26, 2012 (tracking the legislative effort to recognize that statutes of
limitations can be barriers to those not psychologically ready to file claims).
134. See, e.g., Jarriett v. Wilson, 162 F. App'x 394, 404 (6th Cir. 2005) (Moore, J., dissenting)
(finding no physical injury where a prisoner was forced to stand in a 2.5-square-foot
cage "for approximately thirteen hours (naked for the first eight to ten ... ), in acute pain, with
. . . visible swelling in . . . his leg"); Brown v. Simmons, No. V-03-122, 2007
WL 654920 at *3, *6 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 23, 2007) (finding no physical injury where a prisoner
suffered second-degree bums to the face, which healed); Hancock v. Payne, No. 103-CV-671,
2006 WL 21751 at *3 (S.D. Miss. Jan. 4, 20o6) (holding that allegations of repeated sexual
assault by guards were not claims of physical injury). As other commentators have noted,
barring recovery for sexual assault, among other injuries, through a restrictive reading of the
prior physical injury requirement is in "sharp tension" with congressional attempts to
eliminate sexual violence and coercion in prison. Schlanger & Shay, supra note 46, at 144-45; see
also Katherine C. Parker, Female Inmates Living in Fear: Sexual Abuse by Correctional Officers in
the District ofColumbia, so AM. U. J. GENDER Soc. POL'Y & L. 443, 461-63 (2002) (describing the
PLRA's effects on inmate claims for harms stemming from rape by guards).
135. See, e.g., Pool v. Sebastian County, 418 F.3 d 934, 943 (8th Cir. 2005) (noting the defendants'
claim that no physical injury resulted from improper medical care leading to stillbirth but
dismissing the case on jurisdictional grounds); Liner v. Goord, 196 F.3d 132, 135 (24 Cir.
1999) ("[T]he alleged sexual assaults qualify as physical injuries as a matter of common
sense."); Clifton v. Eubank, 418 F. Supp. 2d 1243, 1245 (D. Colo. 2006) (finding that
improper medical care leading to stillbirth constituted physical injury); Hancock, 2006 WL
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block prisoners' ability to recover for even severe violations.
Failing to appreciate the nature of a First Amendment violation has barred
recovery for those plaintiffs who have reached the courts and has blocked
access, via both the prior physical injury requirement directly and via the
cascade described above, for the thousands whose cases have "disappeared" as a
result of the PLRA. As applied to block access to the courts, the physical injury
requirement runs afoul of the First Amendment right to petition the
government."'
The PLRA is thus a mismatched "solution" to a misunderstood problem.
The procedural barriers constructed by the PLRA in general, and the prior
physical injury requirement in particular, have inhibited nonfrivolous
lawsuits.' 7 At best, proponents of the legislation have failed to show that
procedural mechanisms like filing deadlines and filing fees have not obstructed
legitimate claims."' At worst, through the PLRA, the government is "severely
inhibiting prisoners' abilities to protect themselves from the crimes it commits
against them." 3 9 Despite repeated professions by legislators that they did not
wish to increase burdens for legitimate grievances by enacting the statute,14o
the PLRA "seems to be making even constitutionally meritorious cases harder
both to bring and to win."14' Independently of data showing that the PLRA has
blocked meritorious litigation, but with particular urgency in light of it, courts
should hold that § 1997e(e) is "unconstitutional to the extent that it precludes
First Amendment claims.4
21751, at *3 (concluding that the "bare allegation of sexual assault" does not satisfy the
physical injury requirement).
136. See Percival v. Rowley, No. 1:02-CV-363, 2005 WL 2572034, at *2 (W.D. Mich. Oct. 12,
2005) (noting that applying the physical injury requirement "to effectively foreclose a
prisoner's First Amendment action would put [S 1997e(e)] on shaky constitutional
ground").
137. See Boston, supra note 13, at 432-33; Anna Rapa, Comment, One Brick Too Many: The Prison
Litigation Reform Act as a Barrier to Legitimate Juvenile Lawsuits, 32 T.M. COOLEY L. REV. 263,
298 (2005).
138. Ostrom et al., supra note 48, at 1559 (noting that nearly twice as many prisoner § 1983 suits
are dismissed for failure to comply with complex procedural requirements (38%) than for
any other substantive reason).
139. Jeffrey Ian Ross, Resisting the Carceral State: Prisoner Resistance from the Bottom Up, 36 Soc.
JUST., no. 3, 2009-20o, at 28, 39.
140. See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
141. Schlanger, supra note 63, at 1557.
142. Siggers-El v. Barlow, 433 F. Supp. 2d 811, 816 (E.D. Mich. 20o6); see also Mason v. Schriro,
45 F. Supp. 2d 709, 719-20 (W.D. Mo. 1999) (holding that § 1997e(e) does not apply to a




III. HARM TO THE PUBLIC: IMPAIRING THE INFORMATION
FUNCTION OF LAWSUITS
Insofar as the PLRA's prior physical injury requirement blocks access to
courts and facilitates retaliation, it impairs individual constitutional rights, as
the previous Part argued. But this Part and the Part to follow argue that the
PLRA threatens not only individual interests, but the interests of the public
and of the courts as institutions. In limiting prisoners' ability to access the
courts, the physical injury requirement interferes with the critical role played
by lawsuits in facilitating the flow of information about prison life to the
outside world.' This Part calls the mechanism by which lawsuits transmit
information about issues evading the view of the government or the public the
"information function" of lawsuits and looks to the history of the Petition
Clause of the First Amendment to argue that the Clause arose to protect both
individual access to the government and the structural and communicative role
of lawsuits, such that violations of the petition right offend not only the
petitioner, but the society within which he or she lives.
A. The Role ofPrison Litigation: Information Poverty and Public Awareness
As seen above, prisoner litigation tracked the vast increase in the prison
population. But it is also not surprising that, prior to the enactment of the PLRA,
prisoners filed proportionately more federal lawsuits per capita than civilians."
Prison is a managed environment, in which prisoners' lives may be entirely
controlled by their captors. As the Supreme Court said in Preiser v. Rodriguez,
[f]or state prisoners, eating, sleeping, dressing, washing, working, and
playing are all done under the watchful eye of the State ... .What for a
private citizen would be a dispute with his landlord, with his employer,
with his tailor, with his neighbor, or with his banker becomes, for the
prisoner, a dispute with the State. 145
meaningful remedies for egregious constitutional violations). In the alternative, Congress
should repeal the provision.
143. The argument here is not necessarily that the broader public would necessarily read or
invest in communications from prisons. But sectors of the public, like specialists and prison
advocates, and through them, perhaps officials or legislators, may rely on such information
to a greater extent.
144. Schlanger, supra note 63, at 1692. However, Schlanger notes that combined state and federal
data show that prisoners brought suit at rates comparable to those of non-inmates. See id.
145. 411 U.S. 475, 492 (1973).
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In other words, taken alone, a high litigation rate is not necessarily a sign of
frivolity or abuse. As Deborah Rhode has shown, sexual harassment lawsuits
were seen as frivolous responses to the "petty slights of the hypersensitive,"
until it was found that Fortune Soo companies forfeited on average $6 million
dollars in lost productivity, absenteeism, and employee turnover due to
harassment.146 Moreover, several rigorous surveys have concluded that the
majority of prisoner suits are not frivolous; 147 prisons are pervaded by violence,
inflicted by fellow prisoners and by staff.' In this context, litigation is often a
channel through which to illuminate stories that would otherwise remain
hidden, just as stories of sexual harassment once were. True, prisoners lose
most lawsuits they bring, but numbers alone reveal little about the merits of a
given claim. 149
Prisoners have few other mechanisms to communicate about, or improve,
the conditions of their confinement.xso Media access to prisons is scattered at
best,"s' particularly in the midst of the decline of investigative and public
journalism,s 2 and prisons are largely populated by persons without the right to
vote.'s Particularly in the absence of other canonical sources of information,
lawsuits, regardless of their result, are critical mechanisms for communicating
with the outside world about conditions inside prison, acting to facilitate a
commerce in information, both about the subject of the lawsuit and about
146. DEBORAH RHODE, ACCESS TO JUSTICE 28 (2005).
147. See Schlanger, supra note 63, at 1692 & n.458.
148. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 15601(2), (13) (20o6) ("[E]xperts have conservatively estimated that at
least 13 percent of the inmates in the United States have been sexually assaulted in prison.");
Madrid v. Gomez, 889 F. Supp. 1146, 1161, 1280 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (finding a "conspicuous
pattern of excessive force" in prisons in violation of the Eighth Amendment).
149. Schlanger, supra note 63, at 1692-94
150. See id. at 1574 (citing Preiser, 411 U.S. at 492).
151. See Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1978) (holding that "the media have no
special right of access" to a county jail "different from or greater than that accorded the
public generally," as "[n]either the First Amendment nor the Fourteenth Amendment
mandates a right of access to government information or sources of information within the
government's control"). See generally WILBERT RIDEAU, IN THE PLACE OF JUSTICE: A STORY
OF PUNISHMENT AND DELIVERANCE (2010) (describing the role of an internal prison
newspaper in exposing prison abuses).
152. See, e.g., Mary Walton, Investigative Shortfall, AM. JOURNALISM REv. (Sept. 2010),
http://www.ajr.org/article.asp?id=4904.
153. Felon Voting Rights, PROJECT VOTE, http://www.projectvote.org/felon-voting.htnl (last




subjects peripheral to the litigation.5
Consider the case of a contemporary California prisoner.'s Although his
brief focused principally on the major subject of the litigation-restrictions on
exercise in violation of the Eighth Amendment -the brief also revealed critical
and concealed details about prison policy. The prisoner wrote that he, an
African-American, was punished for an incident committed by Latino
prisoners, even though standard prison policy was to lock up all (and only)
prisoners of one race or gang affiliation in response to an act committed by
members of that group.'"' Thus, in the process of protesting his own
treatment, the prisoner, and other prisoners making statements to the same
effect, revealed -without contesting, or even necessarily being aware that the
policy might be contested- information about a possibly overbroad prison
policy that was not the subject of the complaint. By communicating with the
court, the suit served to broadcast information that otherwise would have
remained hidden.57
Of course, neither reinvigorating the media nor extending the franchise
would abrogate prisoners' need -and "fundamental . .. right" 8 - to access the
154. See RIDEAU, supra note 151, at 285-300; Schlanger, supra note 63, at 1681-82 ("[I]nmate
litigation can trigger bad publicity about correctional institutions and officials. Even news
organizations that don't do investigative reporting can use filed complaints to expose
corruption, sex, drugs, and death in jails or prisons .... So even for an agency that doesn't
care about payouts . . . media coverage of abuses or administrative failures can trigger
embarrassing political inquiry and even firings, resignations, or election losses. . . . [T]his
positive ... effect of publicity is likely to be particularly important for jails.").
155. See Brief for Petitioner-Appellant, Norwood v. Bourland, No. 09-56969 (9 th Cir. Jan. 31,
2009); Amended Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial at 5, Norwood v. Cate, No.
1:09-CV-00330 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 14, 2009).
156. Brief for Petitioner-Appellant, supra note 155, at 38, 41.
157. In so doing, the California lawsuit echoed an early pattern of petitioning: although some
early petitions complained directly of prison conditions, some centered on other complaints,
delivering word of prison conditions indirectly or even unwittingly. See infra note 187
(listing petitions complaining directly of prison conditions). For examples of petitions
broadcasting news of prison conditions in less direct ways, see, for example, Legislative
Petitions Database: Petition ofLittleton Tazewell, Williamsburg, to Va. Legislature, Dec. 6, 1799,
LIBR. OF VA., http://www.lva.virginia.gov/public/guides/petitions/petitionsSearch.asp
(search "Tazewell, Littleton"; only link) (asking to be compensated "for the loss of his
slave's legs, which had to be amputated due to frost while imprisoned in the jail on a
charge of felony"); see also Petition of Charleston Sheriff Nathaniel Cleary, Oct. 1825, DIGITAL
LIBR. ON AmEIUCAN SLAVERY, http://1ibrary.uncg.edu/slavery/details.aspx?pid=1439 (telling
legislators that the 37.5 cent-per-day allowance for each prisoner was insufficient "to provide
food, much less blankets or clothing").
158. Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 828 (1977) ("[T]he fundamental constitutional right of
access to the courts requires prison authorities to assist inmates in the preparation and filing
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courts. Particularly in the context of closed institutions, access to the courts has
no substitute. It is fundamental not only to the realization of individual rights,
but to the functioning of democratic government, a fact embodied, as
illustrated in the next Section, both in the original right to "petition the
Government for a redress of grievances"' and in contemporary norms about
open courts and public participation in the judicial process.
B. The (First) Rise and Fall ofPetitioning: Information and Limited
Infrastructure
Petitioning arose to protect the free flow of information from individuals to
the government, for their mutual benefit. Many colonial and early republican
communities lacked news or political structures to facilitate the passage of
information to assemblies. 6 o Politicians were part-time and not trained as
lawmakers, and they had little time for independent investigations of social
problems. 6 , Petitions provided information where formal channels did not
exist. 6,
Petitioners recognized their role in providing information. A common
introduction to a colonial petition read as follows:
L[e]st ... our beeing remoat & .. . o[u]t of sight might too much burie
us in oblivion, or want of information might render you the les sensible
of our condition, wee make bold to remind you, & . . . to add a litell
breath to the saylls and fethers to the winges of your solicitous
indeavours in our behalfe . .. .6
Colonies relied on petitions to make them aware of people in need of public
funds, including those caring for orphans, the sick, and the insane. 64
of meaningful legal papers by providing prisoners with adequate law libraries or adequate
assistance from persons trained in the law.").
159. U.S. CONsT. amend. I.
160. Higginson, supra note 35, at 153.
161. Id.
162. See id. Higginson collected several examples of early petitions from the Colonial Records of
Connecticut from which I draw for the discussion infra. See infra notes 163-166, 168-169,
181-183, 185-186.
163. 2 COLONIAL RECORDS OF CONNECTICUT: THE PUBLIC RECORDS OF THE COLONY OF
CONNECTICUT 530 (1850) (date of assembly: 1668) [hereinafter CONNECTICUT RECORDS,
cited with the date of assembly].
164. 2 CONNECTICUT RECORDS 255 (1675) (describing intervention by the assembly to guarantee




Individuals and towns petitioned the government directly, in the absence of a
welfare bureaucracy or a systematized data collection mechanism, to inform
decisions about where roads should go,"' boundary disputes,' 6 and assistance
to towns; 6 7 to check public corruption or malfeasance;' 68 and to plead for the
protection of debtors.' 6  Well into the mid-nineteenth century, petitioners
wrote to the government requesting release of prisoners, 7o pardons,"'
improved treatment of "colored citizens," '7  labor rights, 73 compensation for
loss of ships seized in wartime, 74 relief from unjust confinement in prison,s7 1
for child custody and support); 12 CONNECTICUT RECORDS 309-10 (1764) (describing a
petition for child support funds); 13 CONNECTICUT RECORDS 612 (1772) (describing an ill
minister's petition for family support).
165. 2 CONNECTICUT RECORDS 255 (1675) (petition leading to a bill for highway construction); 14
CONNECTICUT RECORDS 118 (1773) (selectmen petition for replanning of impassable roads);
15 CONNECTICUT RECORDS 161 (1775) (petition leading to taxation for highway repair).
166. 2 CONNECTICUT RECORDS 65-66 (1667) (establishing a committee to settle boundary
disputes in response to a petition); 3 CONNECTICUT RECORDS 203 (1686) (appointing
officers to study a boundary dispute between towns in response to a petition).
167. RALPH VOLNEY HARLOW, THE HISTORY OF LEGISLATIVE METHODS IN THE PERIOD BEFORE
1825, at 19 (1917) (listing the various Massachusetts legislative committees hearing petitions,
and noting that the residents "petitioned for anything they wanted, and their wants were
both varied and curious").
168. 14 CONNECTICUT RECORDS 132-33 (1773) (petition lodging complaints against an indolent
constable and tax collector, which led to a new appointment).
169. Higginson, supra note 35, at 146 (discussing debtor petitions); see Ruth Bogin, Petitioning
and the New Moral Economy of Post-Revolutionary America, 45 WM. & MARY Q. 391, 407-12
(1988) (reviewing the efforts of post-revolutionary debtors to petition for debt relief);
Gregory A. Mark, The Vestigial Constitution: The History and Significance of the Right To
Petition, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 2153, 2181 (1998) (noting that "debt prisoners ... filed many
such petitions").
170. An Act for the Relief of Solomon Boston, ch. 2, 6 Stat. 42 (18oi); An Act To Discharge
Robert Sturgeon from His Imprisonment, ch. 20, 6 Stat. 40 (18oo); H.R. JOURNAL, 12th
Cong., 2d Sess. 577 (1812) (petition of prisoner Royal Converse praying for his release).
171. Petition Signed by Citizens in Shelby County, Alabama, 1822, ADAH DIGITAL COLLECTIONS,
http://digital.archives.alabama.gov/cdm4/item-viewer.phpCISOROOT=/voices&CISOPTR
=3824&CISOBOX=1&REC= 5 (requesting the release of five men charged with abetting a
sixth "in committing, a mayhem, by biting, off a small part of one James A Moors left Ear")
(last visited Aug. 16, 2012).
172. S. JOURNAL, 40th Cong., ist Sess. 91 (1867) (presenting resolutions adopted at "mass
meetings of colored citizens . . . setting forth their miserable condition and praying relief;
which were referred to the Committee on the Judiciary").
173. Id. (presenting a petition of "mechanics and laboring men" requesting eight-hour work
day).
174. Richard Smith's Diary, Jan. 26, 1776, LIBR. OF CONGRESS: AM. MEMORY,
http://memory.loc.gov/ammem/hlawquery.html (last visited Dec. 11, 2012) (search
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special relief from taxes and tariffs,176 payments to the war wounded, 77
payment for extraordinary expenses incurred as a result of disasters, '7
exemptions from military service,'79 and compensation for government torts."o
Petitioners included both those few with the vote and the many without it,
including women,' ' Native Americans, 8 2 slaves,'" and children, 84 in a
manner that some have argued "mitigated some of the hardship of limited
colonial suffrage."'
Petitions had the capacity to translate into individual relief or structural
change, even for prisoners. For one, felons used the petition right to
communicate with the government, 86 including about prison conditions.'8 7 In
"Richard Smith Charming Peggy"; first result) (describing a petition requesting
compensation for the ship Charming Peggy, which was seized by the British in 1775).
175. S. JOURNAL, i8th Cong., 2d Sess. 56 (1824) (petition of Oliver Blake for compensation for
military service and unjust imprisonment).
176. See, e.g., An Act for the Relief of the Sufferers by Fire, in the Town of Portsmouth, ch.6, 6
Stat. 49 (1803).
177. See, e.g., H.R. JOURNAL, 3oth Cong., ist Sess. 171 (1847) (petition of Alexander McDonald).
178. S. JOURNAL, 34th Cong., 3d Sess. 132 (1857) (petition for relief of shipwrecked mariners).
179. S. JOURNAL, 38th Cong., 2d Sess. 114 (1865) (petition of ministers requesting exemption from
military service).
18o. H.R. JOURNAL, 15th Cong., ist Sess. 4 (1817) (petition for compensation for a house used as
barracks during "the late war").
181. See LINDA J. LUMSDEN, RAMPANT WOMEN: SUFFRAGISTS AND THE RIGHT OF ASSEMBLY 54-58
(1997) (noting Elizabeth Cady Stanton and Susan B. Anthony's drive to launch a
'"mammoth petition' . . . too big for Congress to ignore" (quoting 3 ELIZABETH CADY
STANTON, SUSAN B. ANTHONY & MATILDA JOSLYN GAGE, HISTORY OF WOMAN SUFFRAGE:
1876-1885, at 58 (1886))); Jacob Katz Cogan & Lori D. Ginzberg, 1846 Petition for Woman's
Suffrage, New York State Constitutional Convention, 22 SIGNS 427, 437-38 (1997); see also 1
CONNECTICUT RECORDS 319 (1658) (women petitioners complaining of a minister's
indiscretion and seeking replacement); 2 CONNECTICUT RECORDS 84 (1668) (female
petitioner's claim referred to town officials).
i82. 3 CONNECTICUT RECORDS 219 (1686) (Podunck Indian land petition); 4 CONNECTICUT
RECORDS 280 (1698) (Pequott Indian petition); 14 CONNECTICUT RECORDS 130 (1773)
(Massatucksett tribe land petition).
183. 2 PUBLIC RECORDS OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT, 1778-1780, at 427-28 (1779) (approval of
an emancipation petition from a "negro man slave" owned by a resident who joined the
British).
184. Children would have petitioned through adults, as guardians ad litem or otherwise. Mark,
supra note 169, at 2182.
i8s. Higginson, supra note 35, at 153.





one case in Georgia, the state legislature, responding to petitions alleging
inhumane treatment of prisoners, "'immediately resolved itself into a
Committee of the Whole House upon said Petition,' and went in a body to the
jail to look into the matter.""' Likewise, debt prisoners' petitions tracked rising
economic hardship and ultimately spurred the creation of a system of debt
relief and other legislative interventions, including investigations of prisoner
treatment.'" Indeed, in eighteenth-century Virginia, more than half of the bills
enacted by the state legislature began as petitions. 9o
C. The Information Function ofLawsuits
Petitions were critical sources of information in the early days of the
Republic. The right disappeared from the mainstream not as an inevitable
consequence of time nor for the doctrinal reasons contemporary jurisprudence
assumes,1 91 but at the behest of pro-slavery Southerners, bent on keeping
abolitionist petitions out of Congress, in what became known as the gag-rule
crisis.192 As abolitionist groups learned to stall House business by flooding
187. There is a long history of petitions protesting prison conditions at the state and federal
levels. See, e.g., JOHN FRASER, A PETITION REGARDING THE CONDITIONS IN THE C.S.M.
PRISON AT COLUMBIA, S.C., ADDRESSED TO THE CONFEDERATE AUTHORITIES 27-29 (George
L. Anderson ed., Univ. of Kan. Pub. 1962) (1864) (petition on behalf of Union officers
confined in Confederate prison complaining of "rations short in quantity & very inferior in
quality," a "great want of adequate shelter," "officers weak & sickly from long confinement
& insufficiently supplied with clothing, blankets & shoes hav[ing] suffered severely from
cold & rain," and the "provoking detention of letters monies & boxes from home"); The
Petition of Isaac Ogden, George Watts, and Arent Kingsland, reprinted in NEw JERSEY IN THE
AMERICAN REVOLUTION 1763-1783: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 246 (Larry R. Gerlach ed.,
1975) (petition of suspected Tory loyalists to the New Jersey Council of Safety, writing of
overcrowding, lack of water or food, and unsanitary conditions).
188. Higginson, supra note 35, at 147 n.27 (quoting HARLow, supra note 167, at 97).
189. See sources cited supra note 169.
,go. RAYMOND BAILEY, POPULAR INFLUENCE UPON PUBLIC POLICY: PETITIONING IN EIGHTEENTH-
CENTURY VIRGINIA 64, 122 (1979); see also Higginson, supra note 35, at 144 (noting that
petitioning "originated more bills in pre-constitutional America than any other source of
legislation").
191. See infra Part V.
192. Changes in mass politics set the scene for the decline of petitioning, and the gag-rule crisis
forced the tide at the federal level. See Mark, supra note 169, at 2216.
By the early nineteenth century, the petition system had begun to fray. Congress had
long adhered to a practice of "attempt[ing] to pass favorably or unfavorably on every
petition," beginning each legislative session by reading petitions submitted from the states.
Higginson, supra note 35, at 143; see also id. at 157 (noting that Jacksonian sentiment
demanded total availability of representatives, who were said to owe "unrelaxing
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Congress with antislavery petitions, a coalition of angered Southern legislators
demanded that the petitions be sent to committees to die and ultimately
secured the passage of a standing gag order. 193 The petition right would not be
reawakened for nearly one hundred years. 194
responsibility to the vigilance of public opinion" (quoting Democratic Review, An
Introductory Statement of Democratic Principle, in SOCIAL THEORIES OF JACKSONIAN
DEMOCRACY 21, 23 (Joseph L. Blau ed., 1954))). House rules were ill-suited to volume, a
lesson soon incorporated by enterprising advocates, who used petitions "for mass agitation
on numerous topics, ranging from the legality of the Bank of the United States to the
annexation of Texas." David C. Frederick, John Quincy Adams, Slavery, and the Disappearance
of the Right of Petition, 9 LAW & HIsT. REV. 113, 119 (1991). By the 1830s, groups like the
American Anti-Slavery Society had learned how to slow legislative business by flooding
Congress with hundreds of thousands of petitions. See, e.g., id. at 121, 132.
Legislators used procedure as a shield from substance, responding to petitions with
motions to refuse. But these members, led by a coalition of angered Southerners, soon
demanded a different solution: that petitions be tabled, or sent to committees to die. See,
e.g., id. at 123. By 1840, the House adopted a standing "gag" rule to fully refuse antislavery
petitions: "That no petition, memorial, resolution, or other paper praying the abolition of
slavery .. . shall be received by this House, or entertained in any way whatever." Robert P.
Ludlum, The Antislavery "Gag-Rule": History and Argument, 26 J. NEGRO HIST. 203, 215
(1941). After four years and considerable parliamentary brinksmanship, including the
near-censure of John Quincy Adams, the anti-gag rule coalition was able to rescind the gag
rule in exchange for a compromise that allowed petitions to be received but silenced by
referral to a committee where they would "sleep the sleep of death." See Frederick, supra, at
139 (quoting 12 REG. DEB. 2000-01 (1835) (statement of Rep. John Quincy Adams)). For
general historical treatments of the gag-rule crisis, see MILLER, supra note 2, 258, 269, which
details John Quincy Adams's efforts to foster debate about slavery in Congress; Frederick,
supra, at 114, which argues that procedural barriers instituted in reaction to antislavery
petition campaigns "led to the decline of petitioning as a means for individual citizens to
communicate grievances on issues of public policy to Congress"; and Mark, supra note 169,
at 2212-26, which argues that petitioning subsided as a result of changes in mass politics.
193. See supra note 192 (reviewing the gag-rule crisis).
194. Many state constitutions contain a right to "petition the legislature," as distinct from the
federal constitutional right to petition the "Government" writ large. See MD. CONST. art. XI
Declaration of Rights ("That every man hath a right to petition the Legislature, for the
redress of grievances, in a peaceable and orderly manner."); see, e.g., Edmund G. Brown,
The Right To Petition: Political or Legal Freedom?, 8 UCLA L. REV. 729, 731-32 (1961)
(discussing California's statutory provision). At the state level, direct petitioning evolved
into lobbying, and in certain contexts, to initiative and referendum rights. Scholars of the
Progressive Era expressly linked initiative and referendum campaigns to the right to
petition. See, e.g., W.A. Coutts, Is a Provision for the Initiative and Referendum Inconsistent with
the Constitution of the United States?, 6 MICH. L. REV. 304, 316 (1908) ("[T]hose who contend
for the constitutionality of the Initiative and Referendum . . . insist that its exercise is as
consistent with the Constitution of the United States as is the exercise of the right of
petition .... They believe that the petition should cease to be a weak and impotent toy, the




Alternative structures eventually replaced the communicative roles of
petitioning in most corners: the expansion of the franchise and the rise of
bureaucratic information-collection mechanisms made direct communication
with the government arguably less critical, in some contexts, than it had once
been. But certain corners of contemporary society, most notably prisons, retain
the characteristics of information poverty that marked early American life and
that gave rise to constitutional protection for petitioning the government. As
used here, "information poverty" refers to the condition in which an institution
or dynamic 95 is relatively or wholly inaccessible from the outside, and
knowledge of that institution or dynamic does not flow, or flow readily, from
the inside. Information poverty thus is distinct from, and more serious than,
lack of transparency: whereas transparency refers to the ability to see into an
institution, information poverty pairs the inability to see in with the inability to
speak out from within.'9' Information-poor institutions like prisons lack
the alternative information-collection and information-dissemination
mechanisms available to free society, making it essential to protect-perhaps
specially -prisoners' direct communication with the government. It is perhaps
not surprising, then, that when the right to petition resurfaced in the
mid-twentieth century, one of the first contexts in which it did so was in prisons,
when the Court situated prisoners' rights to access the courts-until then,
vaguely rooted- in the right to petition in Cruz v. Beto, discussed infra Part V.'9 '
As the judicial and legislative roles diverged in the nineteenth century, early
ideals about the role of petitions in communicating with government translated
into ideas about the roles of lawsuits, trials, and newly independent courts in
providing information to a public beyond the litigants themselves,'9' a pattern
into the Initiative and become a club representing the power of the people in their sovereign
capacity."). As will be noted later, both state and federal petition rights remain viable.
195. I say "institution or dynamic" to suggest that relationships or social paradigms may be
information poor- a well-disguised but abusive marriage, for instance, may so restrain the
ability to "speak out" as to be information poor; a leper colony, a ghetto, or an exploited
child may be so isolated from the public at large as to lack transparency, and so deprived as
to lack the means to communicate to the outside.
196. Thus, as I use the term "information poverty," the White House may lack transparency, but
it is not information poor, as those within may communicate with the outside, but the
National Security Agency is information poor, as it is both difficult to see in and difficult to
report out. Information poverty is concerned with flows of information from the inside to
the outside; information flows may also be stifled internally, but that is irrelevant here.
197. 405 U.S. 319, 321 (1972); see discussion infra Section V.A.
198. Early legislatures, including the national Congress, played quasi-judicial roles in some areas,
a vestige of English practice. See, e.g., Higginson, supra note 35, at 145 (noting that the early
Connecticut legislature, "like other colonial legislatures, performed both legislative and
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illustrated by the California case discussed above.' 99 Thus the modern Court
has justified open-courts rules and the right to litigate as serving not only
procedural fairness ends - the elimination of "secret bias or partiality,"2'0 the
preservation of the fact and "appearance of justice"2 o'-but governance ends,
from the "prophylactic purpose" of "providing an outlet for community
concern, hostility, and emotion,"202 to the construction of "the court system as
a designated alternative to force."20 3
As petitioning long played a role as a structural counterweight to
information problems in government, so litigation, one form of the modern
204
petition, can serve as "a vehicle for effective political expression and
association, as well as a means of communicating useful information to the
public." 20  It can "facilitate the informed public participation that is a
cornerstone of democratic society."12o And it can provide an avenue for "the
distinctive contribution of a minority group to the ideas and beliefs of our
society." 2 7 As such, contemporary courts enshrine norms of public
information in protecting open trials, civil and criminal,2os and in affirming the
structural importance of lawsuits. The protections share not only justifications
judicial functions"); see also id. at 146 ("Partly because early colonies lacked strong judicial
institutions, the legislatures heard and resolved these conflicts.").
199. See supra note 155 and accompanying text.
zoo. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 569 (1980).
2ol. Id. at 572 (1980) (quoting Offut v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 14 (1954)).
202. Id. at 571.
203. BE & K Constr. Co. v. NLRB, 536 U.S. 516, 532 (2002).
204. As noted elsewhere, the petition right also protects certain forms of communication to the
legislature, including lobbying. See infra note 251.
20s. Borough of Duryea v. Guarnieri, 131 S. Ct. 2488, 2500 (2011) (quoting In re Primus, 436 U.S.
412, 431 (1978)).
206. Id.
207. Id. (quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 431 (1963)); see infra note 249.
208. See, e.g., Presley v. Georgia, 130 S. Ct. 721, 722 (2010) (per curiam) (reversing a conviction
because a "lone courtroom observer" was excluded from a voir dire); Richmond
Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 58o-81 (1980) (holding that the First and
Fourteenth Amendments guarantee the public and the press a right to attend criminal trials
absent an overriding articulated interest); NBC Subsidiary (KNBC-TV), Inc. v. Superior
Court of L.A. Cnty., 20 Cal. 4 th 1178, 1181-82 (1999) (establishing the public's right to
access noncriminal proceedings); see also Judith Resnik, Fairness in Numbers: A Comment on
AT&T v. Concepcion, Wal-Mart v. Dukes, and Turner v. Rogers, 125 HARv. L. REv. 8o, 87,
92 (2011) (discussing the norm of publicity and noting that state and federal constitutions
"entrench th[e] norm of publicity in courts by turning rituals of public attendance into
rights"). The open courts norm is echoed in concerns about closed arbitral proceedings and




but outputs: as open courts rules "enhance the integrity and quality of what
takes place"2 o' in the courtroom, so petition rights, particularly in conditions of
information poverty, serve to "enhance the integrity and quality of what takes
place" in total institutions like prisons.
As Justice Blackmun noted, particularly because a person "convicted of a
serious crime and imprisoned usually is divested of the franchise, the right to
file a court action stands ... as his most 'fundamental political right, because
preservative of all rights."'2 o Thus, if litigation carries great weight where
information is rich, the right to litigate takes on heightened meaning where
information is poor. Seen in this light, efforts to restrict prisoners' ability
to bring claims about constitutional violations-like the prior physical
injury requirement, through the direct and cascade mechanisms detailed in
Part I -are especially problematic, both because they interfere with prisoners'
individual rights and because they interfere with the second tier of protections
enshrined in the Petition Clause: those that protect public access to
information about closed institutions and problems evading the view of the
government.
IV. HARM TO THE COURTS: INTERFERING WITH THE SEPARATION OF
POWERS
The legislative campaigns of the mid-1990s bore traces of antebellum fights
over slavery; again in the 1990s, a group bent on keeping the voices of
"undesirables" from overwhelming a government institution used law and
procedure to make it harder, if not impossible, for that group to bring suit.n
But the gag-rule crisis and the PLRA did more than restrict outcomes for
litigants themselves. Both affected the ability to be heard in the first place. In
addition to chilling prisoner grievances and restricting public knowledge of
prison conditions, the physical injury requirement thus inflicts a third level of
harm to the courts as institutions.
In the prison context, retaliation is a problem not only for the punishment
it inflicts, but also for the punishments it may conceal. By blocking access to
the courts, the physical injury requirement permits both retaliation and
zog. Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 578.
210. Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 15 (1992) (Blackmun, J., concurring in the judgment)
(quoting Yick Wo. v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886)).
211. The gag rule blocked the arrival of information to the legislature, and the physical injury
requirement blocks the arrival of information to the courts. The analogy is nonetheless more
apt than it would be in the contemporary sphere, as early legislatures played a judicial role.
See supra note 198-
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underlying violations to go unremedied. In so doing, the requirement, as
applied to violations of intangible rights, interferes with the courts' ability to
make real the rights that prisoners maintain. Alongside harms to plaintiffs and
the public, the prior physical injury requirement thus interferes with the
constitutional separation of powers, posing discrete harms to the judicial
branch by insulating certain practices from judicial inquiry.
An objection to this argument might be that, since Congress has plenary
power to dictate the scope of an Article III court's subject matter jurisdiction,2 12
or in the alternative, since Congress may impose restrictions on pleading or
damages, the prior physical injury requirement is a permissible exercise of
congressional power. But whether the prior physical injury requirement is read
as a jurisdictional bar or a limitation on damages,' Congress may not nullify
constitutional rights by eliminating remedies for their violation, and a "'serious
constitutional question' . . . would arise if a federal statute were construed to
deny any judicial forum for a colorable constitutional claim." 14 To foreclose all
relief, or to read the provision as a categorical jurisdictional bar, would thus
pose the obvious due process and separation-of-powers problems that arise
when "the laws furnish no remedy for the violation of a vested legal right."21
212. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8 (authorizing Congress to constitute inferior tribunals and to make
"all laws ... necessary and proper" to carry out that end); id. art. III (vesting the judicial
power in the Supreme Court and "such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to
time ordain and establish" and delimiting federal judicial power).
213. The prior physical injury requirement is amenable to multiple constructions. Under one
reading, § 1997e(e) precludes all remedies, not only damages. Although the subsection is
labeled "[1]imitation on recovery," the text specifies that "[n]o Federal civil action" for
mental or emotional injury "may be brought" without a prior showing of physical injury,
language some courts have interpreted as either a categorical jurisdictional bar or a plenary
limitation on remedies. 42 U.S.C. S 1997e(e) (2006). Under an alternative reading,
5 1997e(e) limits only damages, leaving injunctive and declaratory relief available. (An
incongruous intermediate position, adopted by some circuits, reads 5 1997e(e) to limit
compensatory damages, but not nominal damages.) See supra notes 96-99 and
accompanying text. Each construction poses separation-of-powers problems, discussed here
and above. See supra Section II.A (discussing the circuit split on this issue).
214. Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 603 (1988); see also Zehner v. Trigg, 952 F. Supp. 1318, 1331
(S.D. Ind. 1997) ("There is a point beyond which Congress may not restrict the availability
of judicial remedies for the violations of constitutional rights without in essence taking away
the rights themselves by rendering them utterly hollow promises."), aff'd, 133 F.3d 459 (7th
Cir. 1997).
215. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803). These problems would arise both in
eliminating the existence of a forum in which to press a given constitutional claim and
because it is unconstitutional to eliminate a constitutional right without amending the
Constitution. Although the "plain text of the Constitution neither supports nor proscribes




Alternatively, what if the statute is read not to foreclose all damages, but only
some? The absence of a damages remedy does not in itself violate the
Constitution, as evidenced by the constitutionality of the doctrines of absolute
and qualified immunity, which leave plaintiffs without damages."' But
§ 1997e(e) does more than limit damages. It creates arbitrary hierarchies
among constitutional rights and, in the process, interferes with the separation
of powers by permitting the political branches to be the arbiters of the
constitutionality of their own conduct and by restricting the delivery of
colorable constitutional arguments to the courts.
Retaliation constructively denies access to the courts, and in so doing,
constructively prohibits analysis of the litigant's underlying claim.117 Because
the restrictive reading of the physical injury requirement facilitates such
retaliation, it requires the sort of "vigilan[ce]" necessitated when, as the Court
has said, Congress-or for that matter, the Executive- "imposes rules and
conditions which in effect insulate its own laws from legitimate judicial
challenge." 8
Two cases help to illustrate. In Legal Services Corp. v. Velazquez, the Court
held unconstitutional a congressional funding condition that prohibited legal
services attorneys from challenging state or federal welfare statutes. 9 The
Court held that the condition violated the First Amendment, and in the
process, "threaten[ed] severe impairment of the judicial function" by "sift[ing]
out cases presenting constitutional challenges in order to insulate the
Government's laws from judicial inquiry."220 In "seeking to prohibit the
jurisdiction," "Congress may codify the traditional equitable remedies offered by a federal
court in its exercise of equity jurisdiction, but it may neither expand nor limit those powers
in cases arising under the Constitution." Theodore K. Cheng, Invading an Article III Court's
Inherent Equitable Powers: Separation of Powers and the Immediate Termination Provisions of
the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 56 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 969, 1017 (1999) (making a
separation-of-powers argument about a different section of the PLRA).
Of course, the prior physical injury requirement does not exist in a vacuum; read in
tandem with the PLRA's drastic limitations on attorney's fees and restrictions on injunctive
relief, it may operate to eliminate a forum for the vindication of constitutional rights,
creating yet another layer of due process problems.
216. For a discussion of nominal damages and distinctions between prisoners and non-prisoners,
see supra notes 118-128 and accompanying text.
217. The same can be said of other practices facilitated by the PLRA, notably the imposition of
complex internal grievance procedures. See supra note 131.
218. Velazquez, 531 U.S. at 548.
219. Id. at 537. The statute prohibited challenges to the statutory or constitutional validity of the
laws.
220. Id. at 546.
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analysis of certain legal issues and to truncate presentation to the courts," the
majority wrote, the condition "prohibits speech and expression upon which
courts must depend for the proper exercise of the judicial power."" The Court
rejected the funding condition as an invalid "attempt . . . to exclude from
litigation those arguments and theories Congress finds unacceptable but which
by their nature are within the province of the courts to consider."m'
In much the same way, the physical injury predicate operates to "prohibit
the analysis of certain legal issues" and "to insulate the Government's
[practices] from judicial inquiry."" Although Velazquez dealt with courtroom
speech, the analogy here is apt, as the principal holding of Velazquez was not
that the content of the speech was protected, but that unrestricted argument
played a functional role in ensuring that the judiciary could exercise
appropriate oversight of matters within its "province"":
An informed, independent judiciary presumes an informed,
independent bar. Under [the statute at issue] however, cases would be
presented by LSC attorneys who could not advise the courts of serious
questions of statutory validity. The disability is inconsistent with the
proposition that attorneys should present all the reasonable and
well-grounded arguments necessary for proper resolution of the case."s
Velazquez identifies a distinct harm in depriving the courts of the
information on which they rely to make decisions. Thus did the Court rely on
the words of Marbury v. Madison, that "[tlhose . . . who controvert the
principle that the constitution is to be considered, in court, as a paramount law,
are reduced to the necessity of maintaining that courts must close their eyes on
the constitution, and see only the law.""' Like the statute in Velazquez, the
physical injury requirement pushes courts to "close their eyes on the
constitution"2 7 and the underlying violation and see only the requirement
itself, thereby creating a barrier to raising intangible constitutional claims in
the absence of an arbitrary predicate."' In turn, the requirement restricts the
221. Id. at 545.
222. Id. at 546.
223. Id. at 545-46.
224. Id. at 545 (quoting Marbury v. Madison, S U.S. (i Cranch) 137, 177 (1803)).
225. Id.
226. Id. at 545 (quoting Marbury, 5 U.S. at 178).
227. Id.
228. In some cases, it is the requirement itself that creates these barriers; in other cases, it is the




argumentative avenues open to lawyers and to pro se litigants."' The statute's
vague language and lack of clarity about prisoners' ultimate ability to recover
further chills the bringing of meritorious claims.23o
Likewise, read in the context of Boumediene v. Bush, the restrictive reading
poses problems for the separation of powers, in that it impairs the ability of the
courts to exercise the power of judicial review."' In order to protect individual
liberty, the Boumediene majority said, it was essential to preserve the power of
the courts to assess the constitutionality of the government's policies: "Security
subsists . . . in fidelity to freedom's first principles. Chief among these are
freedom from arbitrary and unlawful restraint and the personal liberty that is
secured by adherence to the separation of powers."'
Boumediene speaks to the duty of the judiciary to preserve its role as a forum
for those desiring to challenge the fact of their confinement. But the language
of Boumediene can be read to transcend habeas challenges, affirming a general
"duty and authority of the Judiciary to call the jailer to account"" and a
continuing role for the courts in checking the exercise of power by the political
branches. 4 Boumediene strengthens "the notion that the denial of access raises
constitutional concerns whenever it interferes with judicial resolution of viable
229. See, e.g., Hearing on H.R. 4109, supra note 12, at 8 (statement of Stephen Bright, President,
Southern Center for Human Rights) ("Prior to enactment of the PLRA, we brought suit on
behalf of women who were constantly splattered with bodily waste as a result of being
housed with severely mentally ill women. Our clients could not sleep at night because the
mentally ill women shrieked and carried on loud conversations, often with themselves. We
would not bring that suit today. Our clients were degraded, they were deprived of sleep, but
they suffered no physical injury."); see also id. (noting that the requirement "changes the
framework of the debate because it provides incentives for officials to argue that truly
reprehensible and degrading conduct was acceptable because it did not produce a 'physical
injury"').
230. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 135 (noting disagreements about what constitutes physical
injury).
231. 553 U.S. 723, 797 (2oo8).
232. Id.
233. Id. at 745.
234. See id. at 742-43 (discussing separation-of-powers cases). Boumediene cites Justice Jackson's
concurrence in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952): "[T]he
Constitution diffuses power the better to secure liberty." See also Marbury v. Madison, 5
U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 166 (1803) ("But where a specific duty is assigned by law, and
individual rights depend upon the performance of that duty, it seems equally clear that the
individual who considers himself injured has a right to resort to the laws of his country for a
remedy.").
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claims,""s as such denials compromise the ability of the courts to fulfill their
constitutional role. Fulfilling such duties requires that courts hear of potential
excesses, in conditions-of-confinement cases as in fact of confinement cases.
Thus the Boumediene Court underscored that prisoners' access to the courts "is
a necessity to determine the lawfulness of their status, even if, in the end, they
do not obtain the relief they seek.""'
Both Velazquez and Boumediene thus stand for the broad principles
that access-to-courts violations harm not only litigants but the courts
themselves, and that courts must resist efforts to restrict their ability to check
governmental excess by ensuring that colorable constitutional arguments reach
the judiciary. Understood in this way, the physical injury requirement poses
separation-of-powers problems. By creating arbitrary and unpredictable
barriers to recovery, the requirement interferes with the core functioning of the
judiciary by prescribing a formalist principle with the potential to eliminate
"intangible" constitutional claims, like religion, process, or speech claims."'
Each of the branches is implicated in this process. When the political branches
retaliate or facilitate retaliation, as through the physical injury requirement,
they assert the prerogative to insulate certain actions from review."9 And when
235. Stephen I. Vladeck, Boumediene's Quiet Theory: Access to Courts and the Separation ofPowers,
84 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 2107, 2146 (2009). The argument is not that all barriers, incidental
or severe, to access are inherently unconstitutional, but that barriers may pose constitutional
concerns.
236. Even in otherwise limiting holdings, the Court has emphasized that prisoners' rights to
challenge the fact of confinement and the conditions of confinement stand on equal
constitutional footing. See, e.g., Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 355 (1995) (citing Bounds v.
Smith, 430 U.S. 817 (1977)) (restricting the ability to litigate, but noting at a minimum that
"[t]he tools [Bounds] requires to be provided are those that the inmates need in order to
attack their sentences, directly or collaterally, and in order to challenge the conditions of
their confinement"); Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 579 (1974) ("The right of access to
the courts, upon which Avery was premised, is founded in the Due Process Clause and
assures that no person will be denied the opportunity to present to the judiciary allegations
concerning violations of fundamental constitutional rights. It is futile to contend that the
Civil Rights Act of 1871 has less importance in our constitutional scheme than does the
Great Writ.").
237. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 797.
238. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 135 (noting disagreements about what constitutes physical
injury).
239. A further argument might be made that, if the restrictive courts consider themselves bound
by the statute to act unconstitutionally (e.g., by eliminating a forum for the vindication of a
constitutional right), the statute might pose problems under United States v. Klein, 8o U.S.
(13 Wall.) 128, 147 (1871). In that case, the Court held that Congress had "inadvertently
passed the limit which separates the legislative from the judicial power" when it passed a bill




the judiciary uses a formalist reading of the physical injury requirement to deny
retaliation claims, it is "deferring to the Executive on the question of
which suits it will hear," and thereby "entrusting to the Executive [the
judiciary's] own duty to recognize violations of individual rights.""o In this
way, the physical injury requirement - and in particular the restrictive
reading -interferes with the "duty and authority of the Judiciary to call the
jailer to account,""' and thus impermissibly infringes upon the structural
separation of powers by enabling the political branches to be the final arbiters
of the constitutionality of their own conduct.
The Story of Klein: The Scope of Congress's Authority To Shape the Jurisdiction of the Federal
Courts, in FEDERAL COURTS STORiEs 87, log (Vicki C. Jackson & Judith Resnik eds., 2010)
(citing Daniel J. Meltzer, Congress, Courts, and Constitutional Remedies, 86 GEo. L.J. 2537,
2549 (1998)). Tyler and others have argued that Klein stands for the proposition that the
legislature acts unconstitutionally when it asks or forces the courts to act unconstitutionally.
Klein demands that courts reject such attempts, to avoid becoming pawns in the denial of
constitutional rights. See also Lawrence G. Sager, Klein's First Principles: A Proposed Solution,
86 GEo. L.J. 2525, 2528-29 (1998) (arguing that in Klein, Congress "attempted to conscript
the judiciary in a constitutional charade" by asking the Justices to "implicate themselves in
what they saw as an injustice, and furthermore, to do so in the public light of judicial
reason-giving for articulate reasons that went to the heart of the injustice"). Sager argues
that Klein demands that the judiciary "not permit its ... authority to be subverted to serve
ends antagonistic to its actual judgment . . . [and] "will resist efforts to make it seem to
support and regularize that with which it in fact disagrees." Id. at 2529. Thus, if the statute
requires the courts to execute an unconstitutional agenda, it could be argued that in altering
decisional prerogatives of the judiciary, and in implicating the courts in the business of
arbitrarily eliminating prisoners' ability to vindicate the constitutional rights they retain, the
prior physical injury requirement creates the problem that led the Court to strike down the
statute in Klein. Congress, in other words, acted unconstitutionally in directing the courts to
impose arbitrary barriers to recovery for constitutional violations. But see Plaut v.
Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 218 (1995) (holding that Congress could not
retroactively require federal courts to reopen final judgments and noting that "[w]hatever
the precise scope of Klein,... its prohibition does not take hold when Congress 'amend[s]
applicable law"' (quoting Robertson v. Seattle Audubon Soc'y, 503 U.S. 429, 441 (1992))).
240. Access to Courts, 122 HARv. L. REv. 1151, 1200 (2009) (discussing political questions outside
the prison context, but speaking broadly to questions of access to courts and the separation
of powers, and arguing that "Marbury v. Madison distinguished political questions as such,
which the courts could not hear, from those involving individual rights, which they
emphatically should").
241. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 745; see Vladeck, supra note 235, at 2109-10.
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V. CONSTITUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS: TOWARD A THEORY OF
PETITIONING DISTINCT FROM SPEECH
In arguing that petition violations are not rightly understood as "mental or
emotional," the preceding pages have sketched a portrait of petition violations
not merely as injuries to individuals, but as structural injuries, comprised of
distinct informational harms to the public and structural harms to the courts.
At the most basic level, this portrait points to the need for doctrinal
intervention to remedy the persistent denial of prisoner First Amendment
claims absent a showing of an arbitrary physical predicate.
In broader terms, this portrait suggests not only the imperative to shield
prisoner petitions from the prior physical injury requirement, but to reconsider
the direction of recent petition jurisprudence. For reasons to be explained, the
courts have adopted, most recently in Borough of Duryea v. Guarnieri,4 ' the
practice of looking to speech doctrine for tools with which to address petition
claims.
This Part argues that that practice is misguided. When courts look to
speech doctrine to resolve petition claims, they capture the expressive elements
of petitioning but neglect the protection at the core of the right. Petitioning
protects the right to invoke the state's adjudicatory capabilities and the state's
interest in providing them. As such, the petition guarantee protects the act of
reaching to the government for redress, rather than the content of the
grievance itself. Rather than being understood as a variant of the right to free
speech, the right to petition is best understood as akin to a due process
protection for the right to access the courts, perhaps with special concern for
corners of society marked by conditions of information poverty. 4
The lawsuits-as-information model suggests that the Supreme Court's
most recent holding on petitioning, Guarnieri, was misguided, or in the
alternative, that further extension of the Guarnieri principle would be error.
This Part argues that such extension would threaten the rights of petitioners,
perhaps none so critically as prisoners.
In order to contextualize this argument, Section V.A explains the process
by which petition cases returned to the courts a century after their
marginalization in the wake of the gag-rule crisis. It shows that the temporary
quieting of petitioning led to confusion in the courts, and ultimately to the
242. 131 S. Ct. 2488 (2011).
243. Seen in this light, a sound theory of the Petition Clause may do as much to illuminate the





conflation of speech and petition. And it shows that, even after courts
disaggregated petition and speech cases, they maintained the practice of
borrowing tests from one context to reason about the other. Section V.B uses
the holding in Guarnieri to illustrate five problems that stem from this practice,
and argues that continuing or expanding such a practice would compromise
the rights of petitioners in general, and prisoners in particular. The suggestion
is not pedantic, as pointed reservations in Guarnieri might be read as requests
for doctrinal clarification about the distinctions between petitioning and
speech.' Providing such clarification is a project of some urgency in light of
the circuit split surrounding the prior physical injury requirement, which may
soon prompt the Court to elaborate on the nature of the petition guarantee as
applied to prisoners. Section V.C argues that, faced with such an opportunity,
the courts should understand petition and speech as theoretically distinct. It
highlights the need not for an "exception" to the default rule of transposing
speech frameworks to petitioning, but for a new default rule. It closes by
sketching, for the prison context if not beyond, a theory of petitioning distinct
from speech.
Taken together, this Part argues that contemporary First Amendment
doctrine misunderstands petitioning as an individual freedom subject to the
managerial prerogative of prison officials, leading courts to place petitions to
courts into "balancing" frameworks designed for internal prison
communications. In so doing, courts have compromised the interlocking public
and private protections enshrined in the Petition Clause. This Part argues that
the practice of conflating petition and speech is theoretically and historically
unsound, and if not halted, threatens to subsume the core protections of the
petition guarantee into a sea of judicial deference and balancing tests.
A. Petitioning and the Modern Court: The Residue of Speech
The petition guarantee, sidelined for decades by the antebellum gag-rule
crisis and the expansion of the franchise,4 5 resurfaced in the mid-twentieth
century, seeded in labor politics and prisoners' rights campaigns, and gradually
extended beyond those contexts. Courts had long recognized that access to the
courts was of "central importance" to prisoners.4 6 But for many years,
244. Guarnieri, 131 S. Ct. at 2495 (" [T]he rules and principles that define the two rights [the right
to petition and the right to speech] might differ in emphasis and formulation.").
245. See supra Section III.C.
246. Thaddeus-X v. Blatter, 175 F.3d 378, 388 (6th Cir. 1999). For a discussion of prisoner access
to courts, see sources cited supra notes 24, 55, and 236.
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prisoners' right to access the courts was vaguely situated. In none of the early
cases granting access, nor in sister habeas cases, did the Supreme Court ground
prisoners' rights of access in an enumerated constitutional right, instead
justifying access to courts on the basis of broad due process, speech, and policy
considerations .W
As courts began to limit the protections afforded by the Speech Clause to
speech on "matters of public concern," prisoner litigants developed novel
constitutional arguments.' 8 Courts responded by disaggregating employee
retaliation cases-then situated in the right to free speech-from prisoner
retaliation cases, grounding the latter in a newly revitalized First Amendment
right to "petition the government for redress of grievances." The revitalization
of the petition right in the prison context accompanied a revitalization in other
spheres, from civil rights"' to labor"o to antitrust.2 s' In 1972, the Supreme
Court situated the right of access to the courts in the Petition Clause in both
the antitrust context, in California Motor Transport v. Trucking Unlimited, and
247. See sources cited supra note 55.
248. Thaddeus-X, 175 F. 3d at 390 (noting that petitioners began to "plead more artfully,"
invoking their rights to assembly and petition in the hopes of avoiding the "matter of public
concern" limitation on their speech rights).
249. See, e.g., Bhd. of R.R. Trainmen v. Virginia, 377 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1964) (holding that the state
cannot handicap the right to petition by keeping workers from advising one another in their
selection of counsel); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 429-30 (1963) (holding that litigation
efforts were a form of petitioning and noting that "[g] roups which find themselves unable
to achieve their objectives through the ballot frequently turn to the courts . . . [a]nd under
the conditions of modern government, litigation may well be the sole practicable avenue open to
a minority to petition for redress ofgrievances" (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted)).
25o. BE & K Constr. v. NLRB, 536 U.S. 516, 531-33 (2002) (holding that reasonable but
unsuccessful employer lawsuits against unions do not violate the National Labor Relations
Act, absent a finding that the suit was objectively baseless); Bill Johnson's Rests., Inc. v.
NLRB, 461 U.S. 731, 743 (1983) (holding that the National Labor Relations Board could not
constitutionally enjoin an employer from suing employees who were protesting business
practices that infringed upon the employer's right to petition state courts unless the suit
lacked a reasonable basis in fact or law).
251. See, e.g., Cal. Motor Transp. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. So8, 510 (1972) (holding that
the "right to petition extends to all departments of the Government" and includes "[t]he
right of access to the courts"); E. R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc.,
365 U.S. 127, 138 (1961) (holding that petitioning-in this case, lobbying-is protected
activity: "[The] right of petition is one of the freedoms protected by the Bill of Rights, and
we cannot, of course, lightly impute to Congress an intent to invade these freedoms"); see
also Profl Real Estate Investors, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., 508 U.S. 49, 57, 62-63
(1993) (broadening the petition protection by rejecting the idea that litigation was without
value "merely because a subjective expectation of success does not motivate the litigant," and




in the prison context, in Cruz v. Beto.2 s2 Ten years later, courts had solidified
the understanding that prisoners retained the constitutional right to petition
the government and that the petition right included a "reasonable right of
access to the courts."s' In time, the disaggregation of speech and petition
translated back to the employment context, such that many access-to-courts
cases came to be understood as arising under the Petition Clause, rather than
the Speech Clause."
Nonetheless, a long tradition of conflating speech and petition left a kind of
jurisprudential residue in the prison context and beyond."' The "tools for
adjudicating . .. retaliation claims under the Free Speech clause ha[d] been so
extensively developed" that courts "tended to import fully that reasoning when
litigants ha[d] characterized their claims as arising under another First
Amendment clause."256 Thus courts have subjected prisoner petitions to
"balancing" rules developed for internal institutional speech, as described in
Section V.B. Even when courts recognized that applying speech frameworks to
prisoner petitions led to undesirable results, they nevertheless abandoned those
frameworks under the pall of speech doctrine.25 7
This conflation culminated in the Court's holding in Borough of Duryea v.
252. 405 U.S. 319, 321 (1972) (holding that "persons in prison, like other individuals, have the
right to petition the Government for redress of grievances which, of course, includes 'access
of prisoners to the courts for the purpose of presenting their complaints' (citing Johnson v.
Avery, 393 U.S. 483, 485 (1969); Ex parte Hull, 312 U.S. 546, 549 (1941))); Cal. Motor
Transp., 404 U.S. at 510.
253. Compare, e.g., text accompanying supra note 236, with Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 523
(1984) ("Like others, prisoners have the constitutional right to petition the Government for
redress of their grievances, which includes a reasonable right of access to the courts.").
254. In short order, a series of circuit holdings challenged the application of the "public concern"
requirement to employee petition cases. See, e.g., Ivan v. Cnty, of Middlesex, 595 F. Supp. 2d
425, 468 (D.N.J. 2009) ("Where the expressive conduct includes filing of a lawsuit or
grievance, the Petition Clause is implicated and such lawsuit need not relate to a matter of
public concern." (citing San Filippo, Jr. v. Bongiovanni, 3 0 F.3 d 4 24, 443 (3 d Cir. 1994))).
255. See, e.g., Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 61o n.11 (1985) ("Petitioner alleges that
the ... policy violated both his right to free speech and his right to petition. Because he does
not argue that it burdened each right differently, we view these claims as essentially the
same. Although . . . [they] are separate guarantees, they are related and generally subject to
the same constitutional analysis."); United Mine Workers of Am. v. Ill. State Bar Ass'n, 389
U.S. 217, 222 (1967) (noting that the petition and assembly rights are "intimately connected
both in origin and purpose, with the other First Amendment rights of free speech and free
press"). But see id. at 226 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (maintaining that petitioning is a form of
"freedom of expression," but suggesting that "litigation is more than speech; it is conduct").
256. Thaddeus-X v. Blatter, 175 F.3 d 378, 390 (6th Cir. 1999).
257. See infra note 277 and accompanying text.
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Guarnieri that although petition and speech were distinct, tests from one
context could be transposed to the other,s' at least as to employee petitions.5 9
In Guarnieri, the Supreme Court held that a police chiefs administrative
grievance and lawsuit against his employer, which alleged that the employer
was retaliating against him for filing and winning a union grievance
proceeding, did not amount to constitutionally protected activity under the
Petition Clause because his petitions (the grievance and the lawsuit) did not
relate to "matters of public concern.""'o The Court applied Connick v. Myers6 ,
and Pickering v. Board ofEducation,262 under which a public employee suing an
employer for a violation of the Speech Clause must show both that he or she
spoke as a citizen on a matter of public concern rather than as an employee on a
matter of personal interest,,6' and that his or her right to speak outweighs the
government's interest in promoting efficiency in the public service.264 In
Guarnieri, the Court borrowed the public concern test from speech doctrine
and applied it to the distinct constitutional right to petition.
In justifying the application of speech principles to petitioning, the
Guarnieri majority turned to arguments about efficiency, redundancy, and
judicial restraint. Petitions, the majority wrote, might "bring the 'mission
of the employer and the professionalism of its officers into serious
disrepute,',265 and might "cause a serious breakdown in public confidence in
the government.,,66 They might be "frivolous",,6' and might "subject . . .
government operations to invasive judicial superintendence.2 68 They would be
258. 131 S. Ct. 2488, 2494 (2011) (asking whether a police chiefs lawsuit could be subject to the
public concern test arising from the speech doctrine). The contemporary generation of
petition cases had embodied unclarity about the relationship between petition and speech,
such that the Guarnieri Court had an opportunity to push petition jurisprudence either
toward speech or away from it. The opinion seems to have been aware of at least some
contemporary scholarship suggesting that the rights be disaggregated, but the holding
reified, albeit cautiously and only in the employment context, the practice of aggregation.
259. See id. ("[T]his case provides no necessity to consider the correct application of the Petition
Clause beyond that context.").
260. Id. at 2490.
261. 461 U.S. 138 (1983).
262. 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
263. Connick, 461 U.S. at 147.
264. See Guarnieri, 131 S. Ct. at 2490 (citing Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568).
265. Id. at 2495-96 (quoting City of San Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77, 81 (2004)).






duplicative of "generous" and "detailed" statutory and administrative anti-
retaliation provisions protecting employees' right to "file grievances and to
litigate." ,, 6 And finally, the majority wrote, the "[a]rticulation of a separate test
for the Petition Clause would . . compound[] the costs of compliance with the
Constitution." 7
B. Losing Access to Courts in "Speech": Guarnieri and a Petition
Jurisprudence on the Verge ofMisstep
In Guarnieri, the Court recognized that "[t]here may arise cases where the
special concerns of the Petition Clause would provide a sound basis for a
distinct analysis,""' such that the "rules and principles that define the two
rights might differ in emphasis and formulation."" Outside the context of
public employment, the Court wrote, "constitutional protection for petitions
does not necessarily turn on whether those petitions relate to a matter of public
concern."" The Court explicitly rejected the contention that the "right to
petition can extend no further than the right to speak" 74 and wrote that
"[c]ourts should not presume .. . Speech Clause precedents necessarily and in
every case resolve Petition Clause claims," 75 before an extended meditation on
the history of the Petition Clause as a guarantor of expressive freedom,
democratic deliberation, and justice for the disenfranchised.7 6
These caveats make it unclear to what extent the Court envisioned Guarnieri,
and the doctrinal transposition of speech frameworks generally, as the rule rather
than the exception. The narrow principle of Guarnieri- borrowing the public
concern test-might be of lesser relevance in the prison context, as some
federal courts had eliminated that test for prisoner petitions before the
holding."' But applying the public concern requirement validated the broader
269. Id. at 2497. In a curious divergence from principles of constitutional supremacy, the Court
wrote that the Petition Clause is "not an instrument for public employees to circumvent
these legislative enactments when pursuing claims based on ordinary workplace grievances."
Id.
270. Id. at 2498 (emphasis added).
27. Id. at 2495.
272. Id.
273. Id. at 2498.
274. Id. at 2495.
275. Id.
276. Id. at 2498-2500.
277. Some circuit courts once applied public concern requirements to prisoner petitions. See
Bridges v. Gilbert, 557 F. 3d 541, 546 (7 th Cir. 2009); Sasnett v. Litscher, 197 F.3d 290, 292
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principle of looking to speech cases to resolve petition claims. After Guarnieri,
when should courts "presume. . . an essential equivalence in the two Clauses,"
and when should they not?278 When, if ever, might the right to petition extend
"further than the right to speak" ?279 When does protection for petitioning turn
on the content of the petition-public or personal-and when does it not?
These questions take on particular significance amid the ongoing struggle
surrounding the prior physical injury requirement, which may prompt the
Court to consider the level of constitutional protection due prisoner petitions.
For reasons to be argued in Section V.C below, the broad Guarnieri principle -of
the transposition of speech precedents to resolve petition claims -should be
understood as the exception, rather than as the default. Despite the textual
(7 th Cir. 1999); Brookins v. Kolb, 990 F.2d 308, 313 (7 th Cir. 1993). It appeared that the
requirement had been eliminated in 2010 when, in Watkins v. Kasper, 599 F.3d 791, 796 (7th
Cir. 2010), the Seventh Circuit held that the "public concern test developed in the public
employment context has no application to prisoners' First Amendment claims, even in the
case of speech by a prisoner-employee."
But the requirement seems to be resurfacing in some corners. See, e.g., Spearman v.
Stoddard, No. 1:og-CV-632, 2011 WL 4005381, at 7 n.9 (W.D. Mich. Mar. 30, 2011) ("The
Sixth Circuit has not yet found it necessary to resolve the question of whether a prisoner's
speech must address a matter of public concern for it to constitute protected speech. . .. The
Supreme Court's recent decision in Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1215-16 (2011),
emphasizes the importance of the public concern component, and makes it more likely that
an issue of public concern is a foundational requirement for protected prisoner speech. It
would be extraordinary if convicted felons possessed greater free speech protections than public
employees." (emphasis added)), report and recommendation adopted, No. 1:09-CV-632, 2011
WL 4005376 (W.D. Mich. Sept. 8, 2011); Towns v. Cowan, No. 1o-CV-264 , 2011 WL
293711, at *4 (S.D. Ill. Jan. 27, 2011) ("A prisoner's grievances about prison conditions are
protected where they are statements concerning matters of public concern in an attempt to
change prison policy.").
The requirement may be in danger of appearing with greater force after Guarnieri.
Some circuits, while vigorously rejecting the transposition of the "public concern" test to
prisoners' First Amendment retaliation claims, have left open the question of whether the
framework might be appropriate in contexts where the government functions as an
employer to prison inmates. See Thaddeus-X v. Blatter, 175 F. 3d 378, 390-93 (6th Cir. 1999)
("It can as easily be applied in the prison context, accommodating the difference between
the government as employer and as jailor, as well as the difference between the free speech
rights of a public employee and an inmate's right to access the courts. Certainly the
government's interests as an employer are not identical to its interests as a jailor.").
But transposing a public concern requirement to prisoner-employees would be deeply
troublesome, as even "personal" prison issues may take on a public character. See McElroy v.
Lopac, 403 F.3d 855, 859 (7th Cir. 2005) (Fairchild, J., dissenting) ("McElroy's question
would surely concern that 'public' [the prison population] and the general public would be
concerned with the policy of compensating prisoners for whom there is no work.").





proximity of the Clauses, neither the public concern requirement nor other
doctrinal tools from speech inherently belong in Petition Clause analysis.
Where courts develop tests for petitioning analogous to those found in speech
jurisprudence, those tests should be employed not because they appear in
speech doctrine, but because they independently validate the "objectives and
aspirations that underlie the right."2' Petitioning should be understood not as
analogous to speech, but as a protection for the right to access the courts
analogous to the protections of the Due Process Clauses.8
The doctrinal transposition principle espoused in Guarnieri is problematic
in at least five ways, the last two of which are of special relevance to prisons.
For one, as argued by the dissent,
[t]he complexity of treating the Petition Clause and Speech Clause
separately is attributable to the inconsiderate disregard for judicial
convenience displayed by those who ratified a First Amendment that
included both provisions as separate constitutional rights. A plaintiff
does not engage in pernicious 'circumvention' of our Speech Clause
precedents when he brings a claim premised on a separate enumerated
right to which those precedents are inapplicable. 8 ,
At the most basic level, conflating the two provisions deprives each of
independent meaning.
Second, as to the narrow principle of Guarnieri, the idea that petitions
merit heightened protection "when they seek to advance political, social, or
other ideas of interest to the community as a whole" is without foundation in
280. Id.
281. Protections for the right to access the courts include those of the Due Process Clauses of the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. See, e.g., Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S- 509, 523 (2004)
("The Due Process Clause also requires the States to afford certain civil litigants a
'meaningful opportunity to be heard' by removing obstacles to their full participation in
judicial proceedings." (quoting Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 379 (1971))); Boddie,
401 U.S. at 382 (holding that filing fees that prevented welfare recipients from filing for
divorce violated the due process right to access the courts). These protections are also
derived from Article IV's Privileges and Immunities Clause. See Blake v. McClung, 172 U.S.
239, 247-48 (1898) (holding that among the "fundamental principles" protected by the
Clause is the right "to institute and maintain actions of any kind in the courts of the state");
see also Frank I. Michelman, The Supreme Court and Litigation Access Fees: The Right To
Protect One's Rights (pt. 2), 1973 DuKE L.J. 527 (discussing contours of the right to access the
courts); Resnik, supra note 2o8, at 86-87 (discussing Boddie and other access-limiting
provisions).
282. Guarnieri, 131 S. Ct. at 2504 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part, dissenting in
part).
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history or theory.28 As the dissent argued, the public concern limitation
arguably "makes sense in the context of the Speech Clause," because "speech
on matters of public concern," particularly political speech, lay at the "core of
First Amendment protection" for speech.8 4 But such a requirement was not at
the "core" of other constitutional guarantees, which protected private and
public conduct equally. The "mere fact that we have a longstanding tradition of
granting heightened protection to speech of public concern does not suggest
that a 'public concern' requirement should be written into other constitutional
provisions," Justice Scalia wrote. "We would not say that religious
proselytizing is entitled to more protection. . . than private religious worship,"
nor that due process rights become "heightened in the context of litigation of
national importance."2s Moreover, as argued elsewhere, the filing of a lawsuit
is by definition "never purely private" because it "invokes a process which may
announce or apply the law in ways that govern the future conduct of others,"
and because the public has an interest in the availability and effectiveness of
adjudicatory processes."'
Third, judicial concerns about calling into question the "professionalism"
of public officials or causing "breakdowns in public confidence in the
government" are misguided."' Nearly every legitimate lawsuit could be
eliminated as potentially "embarrassing" to those it challenges. But even were
this logic to have a limiting principle, it abrogates the judicial role; courts
ought not to be in the business of buttressing public confidence in a
government or its officials if doing so means suppressing, or potentially
suppressing, a legitimate grievance. As illustrated above, lawsuits that question
the behavior of public officials can play important informational roles, such
that undue restrictions on the right to petition infringe more than an
individual's right to expressive freedom.
Fourth, the prison context lacks the redundancy of the public employment
283. Id. at 2490 (majority opinion); see id. at 2505 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part,
dissenting in part) (arguing that since "petitions to redress private grievances were such a
high proportion of petitions at the founding," the Court's refusal to protect them "has to be
wrong"). Scalia's dissent cites Higginson, supra note 35, at 145, and quotes 8 DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS 1789-1791, at xviii (Kenneth R. Bowling et al.
eds., 1998), for the proposition that "[t]he overwhelming majority of First Congress
petitions presented private claims," Guarnieri, 131 S. Ct. at 2504 (Scalia, J., concurring in the
judgment in part, dissenting in part).
284. Guarnieri, 131 S. Ct. at 2505 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part, dissenting in
part) (quoting Engquest v. Or. Dep't of Agric., 553 U.S. 591, 6oo (2008)).
285. Id.
286. Brief ofAmici Curiae ACLU and ACLU of Pa. at 8, Guarnieri, 131 S. Ct. 2488 (No. 09-1476).




sector, insofar as prisoners do not enjoy "generous" or "detailed" -or even, as
the foregoing portrait has suggested, effective- antiretaliation provisions28
Prisoners have-and sometimes only have-petitions.
Fifth, what would be private grievances in the outside world take on a
public character when filed by prisoners, both because apparently private
disputes become, in prison, "dispute[s] with the State,"' and because the
public has both a stake in and a right to information about prison conditions.
As such, any petition rule attempting to privilege "public" grievances over
"private" ones-if nowhere else, then certainly in the prison context-risks
both illogic and injustice.
A ready response to the argument presented in this Part is that a court
could adopt the general principle of Guarnieri-that of drawing from speech
doctrine to resolve petition claims -without borrowing problematic limitations
like the public concern requirement."o The question that follows is whether
the broader practice of transposition is desirable or theoretically sound. Why
not understand petitions through a speech lens, as some have proposed? The
paragraphs below outline two possible mechanisms by which petition claims
could be adjudicated using tools from speech. But the next Section argues that
even with modifications, speech frameworks would not fully protect the
interests at stake in petitioning, for the reason that the petition guarantee is
best understood as akin to a due process protection for the right to access the
courts, rather than as akin to speech (or speech alone).
In the prison context, speech, like other rights, is balanced against
institutional needs. First Amendment speech theory has justified this as a
product of the specialized needs of the settings Robert Post has called
"managerial domains": institutional realms, like prisons and the military, in
which the state acts as administrator.2 9' In its current formulation, speech
doctrine, in the context of managerial domains, balances institutional
requirements against individual rights, weighing potential damage to the
"protected role[] of being ... a participant in the judicial process" against the
"potential damage to institutional authority resulting from judicial review" of
official actions.292
288. Id. at 2497.
289. Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 492 (1973).
29o. See supra note 277.
291. See Robert C. Post, Between Governance and Management: The History and Theory of the Public
Forum, 34 UCLAL. REV. 1713,1776-81 (1987).
292. Id. at 1813. See generally Robert Post, Reconciling Theory and Doctrine in First Amendment
Jurisprudence, 88 CALiF. L. REV. 2353 (2000) (discussing the incoherence in First Amendment
doctrine).
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The challenge, in the shadow of Lewis and Turner, has been to shield
prisoner communication with the courts from a generalized standard of
deference to prison officials.293 First Amendment scholars have proffered a
range of conceptual frameworks for doing so. Robert Tsai, for instance, has
proposed that the pursuit of redress be treated as dissent, arguing that
categorizing lawsuits as "anti-government expression" would insulate them
from some of the vagaries of speech law, under which different forms of speech
are given different protections. Marking lawsuits as "dissident speech," Tsai
argues, would link "familiar, time-honored free speech concepts with a rich
understanding of the civil rights plaintiffs role in constitutional discourse." 9 4
Tsai, in other words, proposes that lawsuits be protected as a special kind of
speech, entitled to heightened protection.
An alternative, while still accepting a speech framework, would be to
protect prisoner petitions by changing the way they are taxonomized within
speech doctrine. Existing "'speech-centered' theor[ies] of court access"2 9s
understand prisoner communication with the courts as internal to the
institution, thus permitting regulation of speech "as necessary to achieve
instrumental objectives.",29 6 The alternative view would understand that the act
of filing suit can transform a managerial domain into a public realm, and in
turn, can alter the standards with which prisoner conduct must be
addressed.' 9 In contrast to managerial domains, in which the state may
"constitutionally regulate speech as necessary to achieve instrumental
objectives," when the state acts in a "governance capacity"-as when it
exercises authority over what Arendt called the "public realm" -it may
constitutionally regulate speech only in accordance with "ordinary and
293. Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 355 (1996) (limiting Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817 (1977), and
holding that this line of cases does not confer on prisoners a generalized right to litigate, but
only "[t]he tools ... inmates need in order to attack their sentences, directly or collaterally,
and in order to challenge the conditions of their confinement"); Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S.
78, 89 (1987) (establishing a standard of deference).
294. Robert L. Tsai, Conceptualizing Constitutional Litigation as Anti-Government Expression: A
Speech-Centered Theory of Court Access, 51 AM. U. L. REv. 835, 839, 841-42 (2002).
29S. Id. at 838.
296. Post, supra note 291, at 1717.
297. In other words, the argument would be that the conduct in question-the filing of the
lawsuit-does not happen "at" the prison and thus is not properly understood as speech
internal to the institution. Where the conduct at issue is the pursuit of a judicial claim, the
conduct does not occur at the prison or the workplace itself, but is "confined to a procedure
that the government offers to resolve disputes." Brief of Amici Curiae ACLU and ACLU of




generally applicable principles of first amendment adjudication."'"8 Petitions to
the courts address not the government as manager, but the government as
sovereign; in turn, the freedom of petition implicates both the ability of the
sovereign to process petitions and the ability of citizens to provide information
to the sovereign. Prisoner lawsuits could be understood to fit not within the
"managerial" context but within the "governance" context, requiring not
Turner-esque deference to officials but more permissive standards.299 Prisoner
lawsuits belong in the governance category, not the management category,
because they support public negotiation of "competing values and
expectations,"3 o insofar as the public and the courts rely on prisoner suits for
knowledge about the conditions of closed institutions.
But the struggle to differentiate and defend prisoner communication with
the courts in a context of rights removal and judicial deference3o' points to a
broader problem inherent in the project of applying balancing rules for speech
to questions of access to courts. Understanding prisoner petitions as speech
leaves them vulnerable to reclassifying and balancing as a general matter, and
accepts the general premise that the executive or the legislature may act as a
kind of moderator, sorting worthy claims from unworthy outside the
courthouse door. And it is here that the practice of looking to speech to
understand petitioning, if not in general then at least as currently structured,
reveals itself to be fatally flawed.
298. Post, supra note 291, at 1717.
299. This might mean translating the idea, from speech, that communications implicate both the
rights of the sender and the receiver. See, e.g., Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 399-400,
403-04, 408-o9, 415 (1974) (invalidating a regulation prohibiting prisoners from writing
letters that "magnify grievances" or sending or receiving letters with "lewd, obscene, or
defamatory ... or ... otherwise inappropriate" content, and holding that such restrictions
violated the First Amendment rights of those with whom prisoners correspond).
300. Post, supra note 291, at 1717 (citing HANNAH ARENDT, THE HUMAN CONDITION 22-78 (1959)).
301. Prison speech jurisprudence is highly deferential to prison officials. See, e.g., Overton v.
Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126, 132-33 (2003) (upholding a regulation limiting the number of visitors
a prisoner may receive); Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 419 (1989) (upholding a
regulation restricting the types of publications that may be delivered to prison); Jones v.
N.C. Prisoners' Labor Union, 433 U.S. 119, 126 (1977) (upholding prison officials'
restrictions on the ability of prisoners to form, or solicit membership for, an employees'
union, and holding that prison administrators were owed "deference" because the "realities
of running a penal institution are complex and difficult"); id. at 142 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting) (noting problems with deference to prison officials, as "prison officials
inevitably will err on the side of too little freedom"). But see Procunier, 416 U.S. at 399.
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C. Toward a Theory ofPetitioning Distinct from Speech
Petition and speech share concerns for expressive freedom and public
deliberation. But petitioning "implicates constitutional concerns different from
those addressed by the free-speech right."3oz The critical attribute of the
petition guarantee as applied to lawsuits - the "right to invoke the
government's adjudicatory processes" -is distinct from, and protects different
concerns than, the right to free speech.3 o3 Thus the petition guarantee protects
the act of reaching to the government for redress, rather than the content of the
grievance. Petitioning "protects access to state-prescribed processes and, unlike
the free speech right, is unrelated to the expressive content of the petition." 3o4
A corollary is that the protections of the Petition Clause are limited to petitions
for redress directed to the government such that communications directed to
the government but not seeking redress might still be classed as "speech,"
rather than "petition." Thus a letter to the government expressing an opinion
in the style of an editorial, rather than seeking remediation, would not fall
under the category of petitioning, whereas lawsuits and certain lobbying efforts
would.30
The Petition Clause protects the state's interest in providing "designated
alternatives to force,"3o6 a forum for the "public airing of disputed facts,"30 and
a mechanism for the "preservati[on] of . . . rights.',30s And it protects the
interests of the state and the public about problems hidden from view, an
interest nowhere more critical than in parts of society, like closed institutions,
marked by conditions of information poverty. These interests transcend
protections for expression alone and operate "without regard to the content of
the petition."3 '09 For these reasons, the right of access to the courts found
within the Petition Clause, like that protected by the Due Process Clauses,
302. Brief of Amici Curiae ACLU and ACLU of Pa., supra note 286, at 15-
303. Id. at 7.
304. Id. at 8; see also id. at 4 (arguing that petitioning should be understood in light of "the
effectiveness and integrity of the state's prescribed processes for the neutral adjudication of
disputes, the public interest in and general applicability of the legal outcomes of those state
processes, and the absence of any true operational interest in retaliating against employees
who use the processes that state law instructs them to use").
305. For a discussion of lobbying, see supra note 251.
3o6. BE & K Constr. Co. v. NLRB, 536 U.S. 516, 532 (2002).
307. Bill Johnson's Rests., Inc. v. NLRB, 461 U.S. 731, 743 (1983) (quoting Thomas Al Balmer,
Sham Litigation and the Antitrust Laws, 29 BUFF. L. REv. 39, 6o (1980)).
308. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 578 (1980).




must "forbid[] governmental conduct that unduly obstructs persons who seek
to present complaints to the state's adjudicatory authorities."3"o
Thus, the Petition Clause exists to insulate certain requests for
consideration by the government from reprisal. In so doing, the access prong
of the petition guarantee reaches to protect expression that would not be
protected were it understood as expression alone. In other contexts, the Court
has recognized the distinction between the content of the expression and the
act of delivering the expression to the government. Certain statements made in
the course of court proceedings, for instance, cannot form the basis of a
defamation suit, whereas the same statements, made out of court, would be
actionable in tort."' Moreover, the Court has recognized a distinction between
the protected activity inherent in petitioning and that inherent in speech,
noting that "[g]oing to a judicial body for redress of alleged wrongs .. . stands
apart from other forms of action directed at the alleged wrongdoer.""' The
starting principle of Guarnieri- that an employee's lawsuit is akin to a letter to
the editor-is thus mistaken. There is a critical difference between airing
grievances before the public and approaching the government to seek redress,
and in that difference lies the divide between the Petition and Speech Clauses.
It is because the petition guarantee protects more than the expression
itself-that is, more than the "speech" within it-that the tools of speech
doctrine cannot fairly represent it. As applied to lawsuits, the Petition Clause is
best understood as a mirror of the due process protection for the right to access
the courts, or in the alternative, as a hybrid of the Speech and Due Process
Clauses, concerned not only with the expression contained within the petition
but with the conduct inherent in filing it. Looking to speech alone misses the
core protection of the right to petition. Prisoner petitions to courts should be
understood not as speech, implicating the needs of plaintiff and prison, but as
310. Id. at 9.
311. This is true even when the speaker out of court enjoys absolute immunity in court. See
Kalina v. Fletcher, 522 U.S. l18, 131 (1997) (holding that prosecutors do not enjoy absolute
immunity for statements made in affidavits supporting arrest warrants, though they would
enjoy absolute immunity for the same statements made in court); Imbler v. Pachtman, 424
U.S. 409, 426 n.23 (1976) (holding that prosecutors are immune from civil suits for
damages for actions taken and statements made in court in the course of pursuing a criminal
prosecution); see also Rehberg v. Paulk, 132 S. Ct. 1497, 1498 (2012) (holding that witnesses
are entitled to absolute immunity from suit under § 1983 for tort claims based on grand jury
testimony, though they remain subject to prosecution for perjury); Kalina, 522 U.S. at 133
(Scalia, J., concurring) (noting that the common law protected witnesses and attorneys
from slander and libel actions for statements made in the course of a judicial proceeding,
even if the statement was alleged to be maliciously false).
312. Bill Jonson's Rests., 461 U.S. at 741.
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petition, a distinct protection, especially in the institutional context,
implicating the needs of three distinct groups: plaintiffs, the public, and the
courts. When a prisoner files a lawsuit, courts should balance not the needs of
captor and captive alone - the managerial speech model, legitimated in
Guarnieri-but the individual's interests in his or her civil rights, the public's
interest in information, and the court's interest in securing the tools necessary
to fulfill the obligations of oversight."' Thus a sound petition model would
challenge judicial deference rules that prioritize managerial needs to the
exclusion of the other interests implicated by prisoners' attempts to access the
courts. In due process terms, balancing the needs of prisoner and prison
misunderstands the governmental interest as located within the executive
alone. But the "government" is not unitary. The judicial interest in prisoner
access-to-courts cases is at least as strong as the executive's (or the
legislature's), and must be counted, as must the interests of the public.
This is not to say that managerial interests should not be counted, or that
the executive has no valid interest in prison discipline. Nor is it to say that
incidental burdens on access to the courts are necessarily invalid. Classic due
process frameworks can accommodate both.314 Courts may need, at points, to
manage dockets in various ways, and all behavior -even communicating with
the courts through the mail -might implicate prison discipline at some level.315
313. In any balancing test, the "government's interests in retaliating" against petitioners who
"invoke the state's own adjudicatory processes to redress grievances are minimal at best and
counterbalanced by the state's interest in the effectiveness of its processes and the public's
perception of their integrity." Brief of Amici Curiae ACLU and ACLU of Pa., supra note 286,
at 23.
314. The classic due process balancing test weighs the interests of the "Government" against
other needs. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976) ("[I]dentification of the
specific dictates of due process generally requires consideration of three distinct factors:
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an
erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value,
if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and, finally the Government's
interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the
additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail." (citing Goldberg v. Kelly, 397
U.S. 254, 263-71 (1970))).
315. But consider that, in contrast to prison cases, in domestic abuse cases, courts do not
"balance" the needs of the alleged abuser and the alleged victim in allocating access to the
courts. Access is not the right to be believed, but it is the right to be heard. See, e.g., Jerry L.
Mashaw, Administrative Due Process: The Quest for a Dignitary Theory, 61 B.U. L. REV. 885,
886 (1981) ("[T]he effects of process on participants, not just the rationality of substantive
results, must be considered in judging the legitimacy of public decisionmaking.").
As to "docket-flooding," earlier parts of this Note noted that those concerns are largely
unfounded. Where courts must engage in triage, a reasonable model would, at the very




The point is not that such concerns should not be weighed, but that, in
balancing the needs of prison and prisoner, courts are neglecting other parties
with stakes in prisoners' petitions. Moreover, disciplinary concerns are
weighed heavily in access-to-courts cases, in the current calculus, and may
deserve far less weight than they currently receive, and considerable skepticism,
particularly where such concerns are employed as justifications for arbitrary or
retaliatory actions, as distinguished from behavior that is transparent and not
unduly burdensome.
The petition guarantee, as applied to lawsuits, is about ensuring the
individual's fundamental right to access the courts. It is about guaranteeing the
right of the public to access information about closed institutions. And it is
about ensuring that the courts have the tools to "call the jailer to account. 316
Any viable theory of petitioning must account for each of these three roles, and
for their intersections: first, the dignitary interests of individuals in the right to
be heard," critical for all participants "even if, in the end, they do not obtain
the relief they seek";" second, the informational interests of the public, for
whom litigation "facilitate[s] . . . informed public participation"; 319 and third,
the structural interests of the courts, insofar as the "ability to lawfully
prosecute even unsuccessful suits adds legitimacy to the court system as a
designated alternative to force."320 Petition, in other words, must be
understood to protect three values, each attaching to a distinct type of harm:
access, information, and review.
Nowhere are these roles more important than in the context of closed
institutions, where informational infrastructure is poor. In the absence of
means to "pull" information from institutions, outsiders must rely on insiders
to "push" information out. Seen in this light, procedural barriers to prisoner
and (2) that triage efforts do not impede meritorious claims. By "meritorious," I mean
something distinct from "winning." I reject Carol Rice Andrews's argument in A Right of
Access to Court Under the Petition Clause of the First Amendment: Defining the Right, 60 OHIO
ST. L.J. 557, 691 (1999), that the Petition Clause should be construed to protect only
"winning" claims, because as Justice O'Connor noted in BE & K Constr. Co. v. NLRB, 536
U.S. 516, 532 (2002), "the ability to lawfully prosecute even unsuccessful suits adds
legitimacy to the court system as a designated alternative to force."
316. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 745 (2009) (noting that prior holdings on judicial
oversight "affirm[] the duty and authority of the Judiciary to call the jailer to account").
317. See Mashaw, supra note 315, at 886-87 (on dignitarian interests); Michelman, supra note 281,
at 1172-77 (noting the range of values- dignitary, participation, deterrence, and
effectuation- that are implicated in the right to litigate).
318. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 797.
319. Borough of Duryea v. Guarnieri, 131 S. Ct. 2488, 25oo (2o1).
320. BE & K Constr., 536 U.S. at 532.
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communication with the courts are offensive not only to the prisoner, but to
the world beyond him: to the public, which relies on his efforts, and to the
courts, which rely on his efforts in order to exercise their own obligations of
oversight.
This, in turn, points to an answer to the questions left unanswered in
Guarnieri. For the purposes of the First Amendment, prisoners who attempt to
communicate with the courts are not speaking. They are petitioning.
The distinction is fundamental.
CONCLUSION
Applying the prior physical injury requirement to bar recovery for
violations of the right to access the courts runs afoul of the Petition Clause and
misunderstands petition violations as injuries to the individual alone. Rather,
petition violations create three interlocking harms: to the plaintiff, by
interfering with the ability to realize constitutional rights; to the public, by
impairing the flow of information about closed institutions; and to the courts,
by impeding the separation of powers, and in turn, the "duty and authority of
the Judiciary to call the jailer to account.""' Understanding petition as a
threefold structural protection illustrates the error inherent in predicating
recovery for access-to-courts violations on physical injury.
But the troika model does more. It illustrates the problems with the
practice, unjustified by theory or history, of conflating speech and petition.
And it illustrates the incoherence -and indeed, the constitutional infirmity -of
subjecting petition claims to rules designed to help prison guards regulate
prison conduct. The model presented in this Note points to the need for a
thorough disaggregation of petition and speech, and a petition jurisprudence
that enshrines protections for access, information, and review. Contemplating
the balance of equities at the core of the petition guarantee could move the law
toward a model that prioritizes the rights of individuals to be heard, and the
rights of the public and the government to hear.
321. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 745.
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